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 The “Aha! moment” is always very satisfying, when one realizes a general truth from 
various particular perceptions and memories.  Noticing that someone’s behavior is strange and 
realizing that he is up to something sinister, or realizing that members of a given class always have 
the same characteristic, brings with it a certain satisfaction of having brought order out of apparent 
chaos.  The epistemic standing of such a moment, however, is something less clear than the 
emotional force that it brings.  Aristotle offers an account of this moment, and the perceptual and 
intellectual activities that precede and follow it, in various works, most notably the APo. and Meta.  
Aristotle is clear in both texts that knowledge begins in the perception of particular things.  David 
Hume, centuries later in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, also spells out an account 
of human knowing that begins in the senses.  Critically, however, Hume asserts that the Aha! 
moment is nothing more than a customary maneuver that does not carry any epistemic weight.   
The purpose of this thesis is to trace the commonalities between Aristotle and Hume and 
to show where and exactly how they differ.  As the dialectic of the thesis concludes, I hope to have 
shown that Aristotle makes a convincing case for the legitimacy of inductive reasoning, and that 
Hume’s reduction of induction to mere custom is not necessary.   
In the first chapter, I will look at the commonalities between Aristotle and Hume in their 
accounts of human knowing that begin in perception.  I will first motivate the comparison by 
looking at the similar ways in which both criticize other thinkers who fail to handle properly what 
perception gives them and instead prefer some predetermined view.  From there, I will start 
following both thinkers step by step in the pursuit of ever more general cognitive states, starting 
in perception.  In the following section, I will look at what is common to both thinkers’ accounts 




an interpretation of what Aristotle says about experience, since he is not exactly clear about the 
finer points of his account, while Hume’s treatment of experience is fairly straightforward.  Finally, 
I will investigate a sort of discursive mental activity that is not directly dependent on perception, 
which both thinkers recognize.  In this first chapter I will exhaust the commonalities between the 
epistemological accounts of Aristotle and Hume.  
In the second chapter, I will investigate Hume’s account insofar as it differs from 
Aristotle’s.  The chapter starts with Hume’s criticism of metaphysicians and establishes his lack 
of faith in any process that claims to lead us from the particular to the universal.  In the next section, 
I will look at what sort of rational discursive activity is left once Hume has cut off the path from 
the particular to the universal.  The next section will investigate the central component of Hume’s 
account of human knowing, namely custom.  The project of this chapter is to show that the moves 
that Hume makes in his Enquiry do not lead us to a place any different than the one in which he 
purports to have found us: we are still certain of our intellectual projects (albeit now on the grounds 
of custom) without any explanation of the certainty and regularity that we see.  I conclude the 
chapter with a brief discussion of the inconsistencies that arise when applying Hume’s account of 
knowledge to matters of religious faith.  
In the third and final chapter, I will turn back to Aristotle to see what the Philosopher has 
to offer us beyond an appeal to custom.  The goal of this chapter is to show how Aristotle is able 
to give an account of universal propositions arising from perception.  The chapter begins by 
considering an objection that the only sort of intellectual activity that can yield certainty is 
deductive reasoning, so that something like induction would be as illegitimate as Hume suggests.  
This section will assert that induction is legitimate, and the following two sections will flesh out 




paying close attention to some passages of APo.  Second, I will investigate what Aristotle says 
about the power of induction to reach all the way to the first principles of particular sciences.  The 
final section considers what distinguishes Aristotle’s account of human knowing from many 






















The Necessary Role of Perception: The Common Insight 
 
Aristotle and Hume begin their accounts of human knowing in more or less the same way, 
by clearly acknowledging that perception has a necessary place in the beginning of any act of 
human knowing.  This common insight into the necessary role that perception plays is made 
manifest in both thinkers’ criticisms of other scientists and philosophers.  After reviewing these 
criticisms, I will trace both of their accounts of knowledge as far as they run together, from the 
beginning in perception, into an account of how those perceptions are synthesized into experience, 
and through some slight agreement concerning the exercise of reason apart from the input of 
perception. 
 
1. Criticisms of Other Thinkers 
In their criticisms of other actual and hypothetical intellectual agents, both Aristotle and 
Hume show that they take perception and knowledge of particulars to be necessary elements of 
human knowing.  Both of them make this clear in criticizing not only those engaging in theoretical 
discourse, but also in matters productive and practical.  I will start with Aristotle. 
In Resp., Aristotle explains that previous natural scientists have been unable to make 
accurate statements about the nature of respiration in animals due to “a comparative lack of 
experience with the facts.”1  Later, he elaborates that it is that “they have no experience with the 
internal parts.”2  As a remedy to this, he says that “we must consult both dissections and the account 
 
1 Aristotle, On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration, trans. G.R.T. Ross, in The Complete Works of 
Aristotle, Volume I, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1, 470b6-12. 





in the HA.”3  The dissections are clearly an instance of concrete experience with and perception of 
the particulars.  The reference to the HA is apropos to the discussion of beginning an account of 
knowledge, as “the first stage [of investigation, the collection and organization of the relevant data] 
is represented by the HA.”4  Thus, in the Resp. Aristotle shows a disdain for those investigators of 
the natural world who fail to look at the internal parts of animals and perform dissections.  From 
this text, it is clear that Aristotle takes experience of the particulars to be the starting point of 
universal knowledge.   
Similarly, in the DC, Aristotle criticizes certain astronomers following Empedocles and 
Democritus who made claims about the nature and movement of celestial bodies “without 
observing it themselves.”5  With this criticism, Aristotle again makes it clear that he takes as a 
element of scientific knowledge the careful observation, akin to doing dissections in biology, of 
those things that one intends to explain, and rejects the project of declaring bodies to behave in a 
way that corresponds with theories accepted without any grounding in observation.  In the same 
passage, Aristotle goes on further to criticize the same theorists, this time rejecting their 
conclusions because “in fact their explanation of the phenomena is not consistent with the 
 
3 Resp. 16, 478a28.  There is some controversy over the translation, as the Greek “τῶν ἀνατεμνομένων καὶ τῶν 
ἱστοριῶν,” here rendered as “dissections and the account in the History of Animals.”  “Dissections” could also refer to 
the lost Anatomies of Aristotle, which seem to be collections of diagrams intended to supplement the History of Animals 
(cf Aristotle, History of Animals, trans. d’A.W. Thompson, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume I, ed. Jonathan 
Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), I.17, 497a31-32).   In either case, the referent of ἀνατεμνομένων 
is the result of a close work with the particulars, so there is nothing relevant at stake in choosing between these two 
possible translations.  See James G. Lennox, “Aristotle, Dissection, and Generation: Experience, Expertise, and the 
Practices of Knowing,” in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals: A Critical Guide, ed. Andrea Falcon and David Lefebvre, 
249-72 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), for a thorough investigation of Aristotle’s reference to the 
Anatomies (or, as he renders it, the Dissections), and comes to a similar conclusion that the reference is to some body of 
work closely connected with observation of particulars.  
4 Andrea Falcon and David Lefebvre, “Introduction: Aristotle’s Philosophy and the Generation of Animals,” in 
Aristotle’s Generation of Animals: A Critical Guide, ed. Falcon and Lefebvre, 1-12 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), 8. 
5 Aristotle, On the Heavens, trans. J.L. Stocks, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume I, ed. Jonathan Barnes 





phenomena.”6  Here Aristotle expands the place of particular observations in scientific knowledge, 
as they are not only necessary in the beginning of a scientific inquiry, but also in the end of such 
an inquiry, as the particulars must be consulted to make sure that the scientific claims are in accord 
with what is actually observed of the particulars.  
One consequence of this need for concrete observation is that one cannot advance an 
abstract theory contrary to what the particulars indicate.  Aristotle makes this explicit as he 
continues his criticism, pointing out that the perception-ignoring theorists “had certain 
predetermined views, and were resolved to bring everything into line with them.”7  By calling for 
the evidence of perceived particulars, Aristotle makes impossible such abstract shoe-horning of 
observable phenomena into previously accepted theoretical systems, thus showing that it is not the 
theories to which Aristotle gives priority but the particular observed facts. 
Aristotle even extends this criterion to his own less certain investigations.  In his GA, 
Aristotle acknowledges that his account of the reproduction of bees is based on incomplete 
observation, as he admits that “the facts, however, have not been sufficiently grasped” and goes 
on to say that “if they ever are, then credit must be given rather to the observation than to theories, 
and to theories only if what they affirm agrees with the observed facts.”8  By doing so, he shows 
that his commitment is not to some particular thesis about the life of bees but rather to the 
empirically available fact of the matter, and thereby commends as necessary the actual observation 
of phenomena as necessary for scientific knowledge, if they should become available. 
Aristotle criticizes those who abandon starting with perceiving particulars not only in 
matters theoretical but also in matters productive and practical.  In an analogy in the EN, Aristotle 
 
6 DC III.7, 306a5-6. 
7 DC III.7, 306a8-9. 
8 Aristotle, Generation of Animals, trans. A. Platt, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume I, ed. Jonathan Barnes 





compares men of moral excellence to those of productive excellence, saying that “men become 
builders by building and lyreplayers by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, 
temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.”9  Here, it seems to be taken for 
granted that knowledge of building and lyreplaying come from nothing other than the particular 
acts of building a house and playing the lyre.  In other words, it is in dealing with the particulars-
--building this house and playing this lyre---that one comes to possess the knowledge necessary to 
be properly called a builder or a lyreplayer.  Aristotle extends this presupposition that productive 
knowledge is gained by experience with the particulars into the moral realm, claiming that the way 
to be properly called virtuous is through nothing other than the development of good habits by 
particular virtuous actions.  Thus, for all types of knowledge, Aristotle takes expert familiarity 
with particulars to be a necessary step. 
 Likewise, Hume criticizes previous philosophers who abandoned consideration of 
perceptible particulars in their accounts of reality.  Twice in the Enquiry, Hume refers to 
philosophies particularly detached from particular perceptions and concrete experience failing to 
“leave the shade.”  Early in the Enquiry, Hume describes two sorts of moral philosopher; the first 
is “one who considers man chiefly as born for action,”10 which is to say that their philosophies are 
very grounded in sentiment and immediate experience and focus less on correct intellectual 
achievement and more on the training of the desires and habits.  The second sort are those who 
“consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being,”11 which is to say that these 
philosophers value right thinking more than right action.  Of the latter he says that such “abstruse 
 
9 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume II, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), II.1, 1103a34f. 
10 David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1977), 1 (hereafter cited as Enquiry). 





philosophy . . . vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day; nor can 
its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behavior.”12  What this criticism 
amounts to is that the philosophies far removed from sentiment and immediate experience fail to 
make a return to those experiences, that they fail to change or to inform those experiences and 
actions that the moral philosopher should inform, precisely because such abstruse philosophy was 
not grounded in those experiences and actions from the start. 
The second invocation of “leaving the shade” is much later in the Enquiry, when Hume 
discusses a theoretical position that, like the abstruse moral philosophies mentioned at the 
beginning of the book, fail to “leave the shade.”  What he rejects is the radical skepticism to which 
one might be tempted to think that Hume ascribes, namely “Pyrrhonism, or the excessive 
principles of skepticism.”13  He asserts that “as soon as [Pyrrhonian skeptical beliefs] leave the 
shade, and by the presence of real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in 
opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the 
most determined skeptic in the same condition as other mortals.”14  In other words, Hume is able 
to reject skeptical philosophy because it fails to offer an account of reality that can be used by 
anyone not engaged in philosophical discourse.  In this and the preceding criticism, Hume shows 
a clear aversion to philosophy that disregards particular, concrete experience, in matters both 
practical and theoretical. 
 
12 Enquiry, 2. 
13 Enquiry, 109.  It is an ongoing question whether or not Hume himself actually ends up following down the path of 
Pyrrhonian skepticism that he lays out here.  Richard H. Popkin, “David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique of 
Pyrrhonism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 1, no. 5 (1951), 407. Popkin suggests that he does, although Popkin offers 
an account of Pyrrhonism different than Hume’s.  Dorothy Coleman, “Hume’s Alleged Pyrrhonism,” The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 4 (1988), 463-64.  Coleman argues that Hume is not a Pyrrhonian skeptic because he 
does offer a way to distinguish between potentially contradictory claims, for example, the distinction between natural 
beliefs and natural illusions.  





Hume’s criticism of ungrounded philosophies is motivated, at least in part, by a desire to 
preclude the vain philosophizing of those who seek “to foster a predominant inclination, and push 
the mind, with more determined resolution, towards that side, which already draws too much, by 
the bias and propensity of the natural temper.”15  Although this similar concern will lead Hume 
down a path quite different from Aristotle, which I will trace in the following chapter, it is worth 
noting for our present purposes that Hume begins from a similar philosophical concern against 
empirically ungrounded preconceptions. 
 
2. Beginning with the Particulars in Aristotle 
We will now transition from Aristotle’s and Hume’s negative comments and criticisms of 
bad philosophical methods to their positive methodologies and beginnings of philosophy, about 
which they say very similar things.  The first point common to both of them is the prominent place 
given to particulars in the beginning of the enterprise of human knowing. 
 While Aristotle makes knowledge of particulars neither the only achievement of human 
knowing nor the crowning one, he does admit in various places that the act of human knowing 
ultimately begins with particular things, not with universal knowledge.  As we have seen, in his 
scientific inquiry into animal respiration, Aristotle makes the point that “we must consult both 
dissections and the account in the HA,”16 putting on equal footing with the pre-existing account in 
his HA the close observation of particulars done in dissection.   
At the end of the APo., Aristotle gives a concise account of the movement from perception 
to knowledge.  “So from perception there comes memory, as we call it, and from memory . . . 
experience, for memories that are many in number form a single experience.  And from experience, 
 
15 Enquiry, 26. 





or from the whole universal that has come to rest in the soul . . . , there comes a principle of skill 
and of understanding.”17  This account is in harmony with what he says at the beginning of the 
APo., that “[w]hat is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest,”18 and before 
saying this, he makes clear the link between particulars and perception, saying that he calls what 
is “prior and more familiar in relation to us what is nearer to perception, [namely, particulars].”19  
So, Aristotle is quite clear that human knowing has as its first step the perception of particulars, 
which, as he says later in the APo., ends in “a principle of skill and of understanding.”20   
Similarly, in Meta., Aristotle traces out a progression from perception to knowledge.  He 
says that “from sensation memory is produced,”21 then “from memory experience is produced,”22 
and finally “art arises, when from many notions gained from experience one universal judgment 
about similar objects is produced.”23  Thus, in both his logical and his metaphysical works, 
Aristotle gives an account of knowledge that begins in the senses with the perception of particulars 
and then rises to the knowledge of universals.   
 At the beginning of the Phys., Aristotle makes a comment in accord with this account of 
knowing beginning in the senses, that “[t]he natural way of doing this is to start from the things 
which are more knowable and clear to us,”24 which he clarifies, restating that such progress is 
“from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more 
 
17 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. Jonathan Barnes, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume I, ed. Jonathan 
Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), II.19, 100a4-8. 
18 APo. I.2, 72a4-5. 
19 APo. I.2, 72a3. 
20 APo. II.19, 100a8. 
21 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. W.D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume II, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), I.1, 980a29.  
22 Meta. I.1, 980b28. 
23 Meta. I.1, 981a5-7. 
24 Aristotle, Physics, trans. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume I, ed. Jonathan 





knowable by nature.”25  What he then says, however, appears at a first glance to complicate or 
contradict the present account,26 that “we must advance from universals to particulars.”27  This 
complication must be understood, however, differently than the way in which the standard 
deductive syllogism28 moves from the universal to the particular. 
 In the sentence between the mention of moving from the things more knowable to us¾that 
is, particulars¾and the apparent departure in saying that we must begin with universals, Aristotle 
says that “what is to us plain and clear at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles 
of which become known to us later by analysis.”29  It is, I contend, these “rather confused masses” 
that are the reference of what is an unusual use of the term “universal.”  I am not alone in so 
arguing, as “most commentators reasonably conclude [that] the use of the term [universal] in Phys. 
I.1 is peculiar and not the typical use displayed, for instance, in the passage at the beginning of the 
[APo.].”30  Rather, here Aristotle can be read to be referring to the end of the intellectual journey, 
which involves a return to the particular (which has already been seen to be a principle in 
Aristotelian natural philosophy) from the universal, as “a child begins by calling all men father, 
and all women mother, but later on distinguishes each of them.”31 
 
25 Phys. I.1, 184a18-21. 
26 See Robert Bolton, “Aristotle’s Method in Natural Science: Physics I.1,” in Aristotle’s Physics: A Collection of 
Essays, ed. Lindsay Judson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).  Bolton notes that this passage has been reinterpreted in 
recent literature, now that “the Physics in particular is now standardly as a paradigm of Aristotle’s use of dialectical 
method, understood as a largely conceptual or a priori technique of inquiry appropriate for philosophy, as opposed to 
the more empirical inquiries which we, these days, now typically regard as scientific.” (1) My interpretation of this 
passage will follow Bolton and the older tradition of reading the Physics as “congenial that Aristotle’s intended method 
in his works on natural science is empirical.” (2)  For a look at the other side of the debate, in which Aristotle is read 
as a rationalist, see Michael Frede, “Aristotle’s Rationalism,” in Rationality and Greek Thought, ed. Frede and Gisela 
Striker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).  
27 Phys. I.1, 184a24. 
28 That is, how “All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal” goes from the universal premise 
that all men are mortal to a statement about a particular individual.  Also see APo I.1, 71a1-7. 
29 Phys. I.1, 184a22-23. 
30 Bolton, “Aristotle’s Method,” 4. 





 In other words, the use of “universal” and “particular” here does reverse some of the usual 
uses of the terms, enough to make them outliers in the Aristotelian corpus.  They do, however, 
retain enough of the significant features of their usual use by Aristotle to merit their use in this 
first chapter of Phys.  As Lucas Angioni puts it, “[t]he opposition between ‘katholou’ [universal] 
and ‘kath’ hekaston’ [particular] means in APo. I.2 an opposition between explanatory concepts 
and empirical data, whereas in Phys. I.1 it means an opposition between generic features 
(understood as data) and specific elements (understood as principles and causes).”32  So, 
“universal” is used to mean broader things, “explanatory concepts” in APo. and “generic features” 
in this passage of the Phys., and “particular” is used to mean more narrow things, “empirical data” 
and “specific elements.”  The uses from the Phys. depart from the more common use of the terms, 
in APo. and elsewhere, by failing to refer to a class of items and a member of that class, rather 
taking the member of a class to be the broader category and taking the parts of that member to be 
the more narrow things.  Thus, the unusual case in the Phys. does preserve part of the normal usage 
of “universal” and “particular,” namely that in both cases the universal encompasses the particular, 
either as a species encompasses an individual or as a generic feature encompasses the particular 
elements that compose it.  The use of those terms is thus not unreasonable on Aristotle’s part; 
however, their use does require qualification if they are to make sense in the light of the rest of the 
Corpus. 
 This explanation, however, does not yet allow one to conclude that the Phys. sets forth the 
same pattern of investigation as suggested at the beginning of the APo., namely a path from 
 
32 Lucas Angioni, “Explanation and Definition in Physics I.1,” Apeiron 34, no. 4 (2011), 318.  Andrea Falcon, “Physics 
I.1,” in Aristotle’s Physics Book I: A Systematic Exploration, ed. Diana Quarantotto (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), 51 offers a similar take, and points out that other instances of Aristotle’s use of words is not 
consistent with him expecting that his terminology be taken in the strict way that he employs it in his logical works: 
“For instance, we have seen that division (διαίρεσις) is not used in the technical sense to refer to the Academic method 





particular things to universals.  What we can say on the account to this point is that, in the Phys., 
knowledge starts with a “jumbled-up or compounded”33 individual thing and ends with an 
understanding of the more particular parts and principles that compose the thing first considered, 
which is a process that seems to lead us in the other direction, from knowledge of particulars to 
knowledge of smaller particulars, or, in a way that directly contradicts the story in the APo. and 
Meta. I.1, from definitions to particular things, which Aristotle suggests with his first example, 
saying that “a name, e.g. ‘circle,’ means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyzes into 
particulars.”34 This could be read to suggest that knowledge begins with definitions known 
beforehand by the mind and ends with the recognition that such a particular does in fact sufficiently 
correspond with the known definition.  Yet, this account given in the Phys. can still be seen to be 
in harmony with the account of the APo. and the Meta., once we consider what is distinctive about 
the examples that Aristotle uses.  The second example, that of “a child [who] begins by calling all 
men father, and all women mother, but later on distinguishes each of them,”35 will shed light on 
the matter.  In both examples, the grasp of the universal is not complete, as the definition of a circle 
is held “vaguely,” and the child does not understand that words for parents refer only to specific 
individuals.36  When we consider other contexts where Aristotle mentions unrefined grasp of a 
form, it will become clear that in both examples he is referring to the perception of an individual. 
 In APo.II.19, Aristotle says that “when one of the undifferentiated things makes a stand, 
there is a primitive universal in the mind.”37  The undifferentiated thing to which he refers is a 
perceived particular, and from its “making a stand” in the mind, a “primitive universal” is grasped 
 
33 Here I use Bolton’s translation; see Bolton, “Aristotle’s Method,” 3. 
34 Phys. I.1, 184b11-12.  
35 Phys. I.1, 184b12-13. 
36 Falcon “Physics I.1” suggests that the example of the child shows how one goes from a vague grasp of the whole 
to clear knowledge of the parts, namely by employing conceptual distinctions to things that show up to perception in 
initially jumbled ways. 





by the mind.  This primitive universal seems to be the sort of thing that the child has in Phys. I.1 
whereby he mistakenly calls all men “father” and all women “mother.”  What seems to be 
happening with the child is that he is given a universal, “father,” and only one particular, his father, 
and with this primitive understanding gained from a single sample, the child does not yet have the 
full understanding of “father,” and thereby mistakenly thinks that the universal term applies to all 
beings more or less similar to his father, namely, any man.  Thus, the primitive grasp of the 
universal, described in both APo. II.19 and Phys. I.1, is the same degree of understanding had upon 
perceiving a particular without already having knowledge of the universal.38 
All that remains is to show that the example of the definition of a circle begins in the same 
place as the child and the first soldier, namely, that it begins with an initial and incomplete grasp 
of the universal.  Aristotle says that the name “means vaguely” (ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει) the universal 
to which it refers.  The adverb rendered by Hardie and Gaye as “vaguely” can be more pointedly 
translated as “undefined,” lacking a ὁρισμός (“definition”)39 whereby proper understanding is 
achieved.  Thus, the example of the definition of a circle is in line with the account given by 
Aristotle in the same section of the Phys. and in the end of the APo., and both seemingly 
troublesome examples in the Phys. do in fact start in the same place as the accounts given in the 
APo. 
 It must now be established that both accounts of knowledge end in more or less the same 
place.  Although this is not strictly necessary for the current project of showing the beginnings of 
 
38 APo. I.4-5 offers a similar account of unrefined knowledge, this time based on a lack of demonstrations that know 
that a feature obtains of a sort of thing  (e.g. That the sum of a triangle’s three angles is equal to two right angles) of 
many or all instances of a kind, but fails to recognize that such a feature belongs to the sort by virtue of the sort of 
thing.  Similarly, in the case of perceiving a particular without knowing its universal, certain judgments can be made, 
but there is missing the sort of perfected knowledge that comes from knowing that such a judgment holds over all 
members of a sort by virtue of them being a certain sort of thing.  
39 Robin Smith, “Aristotle’s Logic,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2020), accessed December 12, 2020, 





Aristotle’s account of knowledge, it will be helpful to see the total harmony of these two accounts 
to reinforce the unity of their common beginning.  The critical step for connecting the endpoints 
of these two accounts is to equate the grasp of a universal in the APo. with the ability to apply that 
universal to particulars.  Aryeh Kosman makes the point that “ἐπιστήμη [scientific knowledge] is, 
as Aristotle repeatedly urges, a discursive disposition or habit of soul, a ἕξις, the locus of whose 
ἐνέργεια is in the activity of ἀπόδειξις, an activity that I shall with qualification call in English 
‘explanation.’”40  I maintain that one very clear way to show forth (ἀποδεικνύναι) that one 
understands a universal is rightly to apply it to particulars, as the child “later on distinguishes” that 
other men are not called “father.”  Similarly with the example of the circle, the act of the definition 
that ‘analyses this into particulars,’41 the act of understanding, is shown forth in application to 
particular circles, not in the vaguely understood definition.  With all of this said, the trouble of 
Phys. I.1 with respect to the unity of Aristotle’s account of scientific knowledge beginning in 
perception ought now to be set aside, as the account in the Phys. has been shown to be consistent 
with the account of the APo.   
Before, however, moving on to what Hume says, I will note that Aristotle considers 
perception not only the best starting point, but rather the necessary starting point.  Elsewhere in 
the APo., Aristotle argues that “understanding . . . can[not] be got . . . without perception.”42  Earlier 
in the chapter, he said that “[i]t is evident too that if some perception is wanting, it is necessary for 
some understanding to be wanting too.”43  Thus, for Aristotle, it is not the case that the best path 
to knowledge begins in the senses, but rather that the only path ultimately begins there. 
 
40 Aryeh Kosman, “Understanding, Explanation, and Insight in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics: Essays on Plato and 
Aristotle” in Virtues of Thought, by Kosman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 7. 
41 See Aristotle, Prior Analytics, trans. A.J. Jenkinson, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume I, ed. Jonathan 
Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), II.21.  In the discussion here, Aristotle discusses errors in 
knowledge that occur when universal knowledge is not properly analyzed back to the particulars.  
42 APo. I.18, 81b7-9. 






3. Perception in Hume and Aristotle 
Now, there is some need to indicate an ambiguity between Aristotle and Hume as to what 
exactly these sense impressions are.  Hume’s discussion of impressions makes no reference to the 
external world, but is content to treat of impressions as they come to us, without making too much 
of what causes them to come to us.44  Aristotle, on the other hand, takes perceptions to be caused 
by things in the world, and truly to be manifestations of them.45  This ambiguity, however, should 
not be taken to vitiate the comparison of Aristotle and Hume, because both accounts are starting 
from what is most evident to us, namely sensory perceptions.  In both cases, the starting point is 
what is evident to the senses.   
I will, before leaving this consideration to the side, briefly mention where exactly this 
disagreement about the nature of perception is located.  There seem to me to be two possibilities: 
either Aristotle and Hume differ about the nature of the perceptive faculties, or they differ about 
the things being perceived.  It seems to me that they do not differ concerning the way in which 
perception works; in either case, perceptions (impressions, as Hume calls them) are received 
directly by the senses.  Where they differ, it seems, is how those perceptions come to the senses in 
the first place.  Hume is unwilling to say how impressions come to be present, since to give such 
an explanation would require a causal account, which, as we will see in the next chapter, he does 
 
44 “Let us therefore, uses a little freedom, and call them impressions; employing that word in a sense somewhat 
different from the usual.  By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, 
or feel.”  Enquiry, 10.  It is curious that Hume uses these usually transitive verbs without a direct object.  The editor 
notes that “he claims to be employing the term to refer to perceptions, independent of their origin or causal implications 
concerning their production.” Enquiry, n.9.   
45 “They [i.e. the senses] bring in tidings of many distinctive qualities of things.”  Aristotle, Sense and Sensibilia, trans. 
J.I. Beare, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Volume I, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 





not think is legitimate.  Aristotle, on the other hand, seems to think that sense impressions are made 
on the senses by real things in the world, that we really do come to know.   
This discussion, however, begins to get into matters beyond the accounts of coming to 
know that are the primary focus of this thesis.  For the sake of the rest of the discussion, I will treat 
Aristotle and Hume as comparable concerning perception, precisely insofar as the immediate 
results of perception are the primary matter from which human knowing arises. 
 
4. Memory and Imagination 
In both Meta. I.1 and APo. II.19, Aristotle includes memory among those faculties 
necessary in the ascent to knowledge.  In APo., he briefly characterizes it as “retention of the 
percept”46 and says that it occurs also in “some animals.”47  In Meta., Aristotle gives basically the 
same account, saying that, in some animals, “from sensation memory is produced.”48  Thus, it 
seems clear that Aristotle treats memory as the faculty whereby perceptions are stored in the soul 
for later use.  Aristotle expands his consideration of memory slightly in Meta., saying that those 
animals with memory “are more intelligent and apt at learning than those that cannot remember.”49  
We will see that Hume follows Aristotle is considering memory as the capacity for holding onto 
perceptions.  
First, however, it would be helpful to flesh out the terminology that Hume uses in his 
account of the importance of starting with the particular.  He uses the term “perception” in a 
standard way, to refer to the process of receiving input from the bodily senses, and as a plural to 
denote the immediate cognitive result of such sense reception, and which he uses as synonymous 
 
46 APo. II.19, 99b37.  
47 APo. II.19, 99b37.  
48 Meta. I.1, 980a28.  





with “sensations.”  Perceptions or sensations belong to a class he calls “impressions,” which also 
includes inner acts or emotions of the person, such as “love, or hate, or desire, or will.”50  Finally, 
Hume uses “sentiment” to refer to the nonrational means of accepting propositions as true, treating 
the term as equivalent to “feeling.”51  Such sentiment is often a reaction to impressions.  Thus, 
perceptions or sensations are sorts of impressions, which can change or create sentiments.   
Before detailing this menagerie of terms for immediate sensory and emotive experience, 
Hume gives a brief account of memory.  In his account of the origin of ideas, he mentions the 
process whereby a man who has experienced “the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of 
moderate warmth . . . afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation.”52  Thus, Hume seems to 
take memory to be the simple faculty of storing perceptions that have passed, which allows one, 
in a less vivid way, to perceive the particular again, even though the instance of perception has 
passed.  Hume is also very clear that this faculty of memory is not capable of reproducing 
sensations with the same clarity and force of emotion, saying “our thought is a faithful mirror, and 
copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those 
in which our original perceptions were clothed.”53 
What Hume has to say about memory matches both what we have seen in APo. and Meta. 
and the account of μνήμη in Mem.54  Aristotle defines memory as “neither perception nor 
conception, but a state or affection of one of these, conditioned by the lapse of time.”55  It is not 
itself the perception of particulars, nor is it an intellectual activity of forming a concept, but rather 
 
50 Enquiry, 10. 
51 Enquiry, 11. 
52 Enquiry, 9. 
53 Enquiry, 10. 
54 See Aristotle, On Memory, trans. J.I. Beare, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume I, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). There, Aristotle distinguishes between the μνήμη (memory) we discuss 
here and ἀνάμνησις (recollection), which he argues is present only in humans.  As we will see in Chapter III, this is 
part of what separates Aristotle’s account from Hume’s.   





is somehow related to both the perceptive and intellectual faculties.  Later, Aristotle clarifies that 
“memory belongs incidentally to the faculty of thought, and essentially it belongs to the primary 
faculty of sense-perception.”56  To reinforce that memory is a basic extension of perception, he 
adds that “many also of the other animals have memory.”57  Since animals, on Aristotle’s account, 
are certainly not capable of any amount of abstraction, this statement makes it abundantly clear 
that memory is, for Aristotle as it is for Hume, a basic extension of perception. 
Hume also includes imagination as an immediate extension of perception.  In both cases, 
the material supplied comes from impressions.  However, while memory holds on to the 
circumstances and order in which the impression arose, imagination is free to go about 
“compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses 
and experience.”58  Thus, it is restricted to the raw materials provided by experience, but it is free 
to put them together in new ways not experienced, and even not possible to experience.  
 Hume is very clear that neither memory nor imagination have any sort of priority over the 
perceptions or sensations on which they are based, saying “[t]hese faculties may mimic or copy 
the perceptions of the senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original 
sentiment”59 and that “[t]he most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.”60  Thus, 
for Hume, it is not the mental activity that creates whatever intellectual or quasi-intellectual 
activity that Hume will later argue that humans can do; rather, it is the concrete perception of 
individual instances that later create the “less forcible and lively [perceptions of the mind] 
commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas.”61 
 
56 Mem. 1, 450a13-14. 
57 Mem. 2, 453a7-8. 
58 Enquiry, 11.  
59 Enquiry, 10.   
60 Enquiry, 10. 





 With this common account of perception and memory, we will now move to what both 




 Just beyond memory, Aristotle lists experience as the next step in ascending to universal 
knowledge.  Recent scholarship on the matter seems to agree that “it is questionable whether 
Aristotle ever produces a definition of experience.”62  Some basic facts can be established with 
clarity, but at a certain point it becomes impossible to advance without controversy.  
 In the accounts of both Meta. I.1 and APo. II.19, experience is listed between memory and 
universal knowledge.63  Meta. I.1 offers more clarifying remarks, noting that experience comes 
“from many memories of the same thing.”64  Thus, memory takes a step beyond memory by not 
only storing past perceptions, but by organizing them in some way that keeps similar things 
together.  Aristotle offers the example of an experienced medic lacking universal knowledge who 
knows that “when Callias was ill of this disease this did him good, and similarly in the case of 
Socrates and in many individual cases.”65  In other words, the man of experience is able to group 
together various cases that he can recognize to be similar, but cannot yet put his finger on what 
 
62 Pavel Gregoric and Filip Grgic, “Aristotle’s Notion of Experience,” Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie 88 
(2006), 1.  The following also begin their treatments of Aristotelian ἐμπειρία by acknowledging in one way or another 
that Aristotle’s account of experience is in great need of clarification: Pieter Sjoerd Hasper and Joel Yurdin, “Between 
Perception and Scientific Knowledge: Aristotle’s Account of Experience,” Oxford Studies of Ancient Philosophy 47 
(2014); Scott LaBarge, “Aristotle on Empeiria,” Ancient Philosophy 26 (2006); Travis Butler, “Empeiria in Aristotle,” 
The Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (2003). 
63 At Meta. I.1, 981a3, Aristotle calls the step beyond experience “science and art,” and at APo. II.19, 100a9 “a 
principle of skill and of understanding.”  In both cases, the focus is on knowing what is universally and necessarily 
the case, as opposed to knowing, as the man of experience does, that different particular cases happen to be a certain 
way.   
64 Meta. I.1, 981b29.  





exactly makes them to be similar.  To offer another image, the man of experience is able to 
recognize many similar pictures and put them in the same folder, but cannot yet name exactly what 
causes all the items to belong in the same folder.  Similarly, Aristotle says that the medic with 
universal knowledge beyond experience is able “to judge that it has done good to all persons of a 
certain constitution, marked off in one class, when they were all ill of this disease, e.g. to 
phlegmatic or bilious people when burning with fever.”66  Thus, the man of universal knowledge 
knows to label the folder causally containing pictures of Callias, Socrates, and all others cured in 
such a way of a burning fever as “phlegmatic,” while the man of experience is only certain that 
Callias, Socrates, and others belong together because they happened to respond well to a certain 
treatment.   
 Aristotle is keen to point out, however, that just because the man of experience does not 
know exactly why the various people respond well to the treatment, he is able to tell that certain 
people, even those he has not treated before, will belong in the same group, because he is able to 
recognize the presence or absence of what makes Callias, Socrates, and the others to be similar.  
Thus, Aristotle says that “we even see men of experience succeeding more than those who have 
theory without experience.”67   
 Hasper and Yurdin take Aristotle to mean that experience is knowledge of facts that are 
universal in scope, “of the form ‘Fs are G’¾whether all Fs, some, many, or none.”68  This 
interpretation seems to be at odds with the account in the Meta., which suggests that the man of 
experience is not fully able to articulate what he knows.  However, if we take F and G to refer not 
to fully fleshed-out predications but rather more general sorts of things (e.g. “people like Callias, 
 
66 Meta. I.1, 981a9-12.  
67 Meta. I.1, 981a14.  





Socrates, and the others”, “responding well to this treatment”), then this interpretation makes a 
great deal of sense.69  The universal judgment “all phlegmatic people will respond well to this 
treatment” is rather, Aristotle suggests, something that the man of experience does not know.  
 A common view of the difference between experience and universal knowledge is that the 
man of experience knows that such is the case, but the man of universal knowledge knows why 
such is the case.70  On the surface, there seems to be more going on between the experiential claim 
“people like Callias, Socrates, and the others respond well to this treatment” and the universal 
claim “all phlegmatic people respond well to this treatment.”  I will argue that there is no additional 
mediating step between experience and universal knowledge.71   
 The critical difference between experience and universal knowledge for Aristotle is that 
experience tells you that some often vaguely described state of affairs is the case, and universal 
knowledge tells you that one member of a universal class always has a given attribute by virtue of 
being in that class.  Thus, the universal knowledge that phlegmatic people will respond well to this 
treatment not only tells you exactly what to look for in a person when determining the applicability 
of this treatment but also suggests that it is exactly because they are phlegmatic that this treatment 
will work for them.  That is to say, universal knowledge is not only a description of a general state 
of affairs but also a causal explanation of that state of affairs.  
 
69 Butler, “Empeiria in Aristotle,” 333-34, also suggests that the claims of experience take the general form of a 
ὑπόληψις, and the same correction can be made to his account to bring it into line with the view I am advancing here. 
70 See, for instance, LaBarge, “Aristotle on Empeiria,” 33.  
71 A logical distinction can be made here that puts some pressure on this claim.  With universal knowledge, 
propositions are known.  Propositions are made up of terms, which are known through simple apprehension.  Thus, 
there should be a step of simple apprehension between experience and universal knowledge.  To this objection I say 
that this logical distinction does not have epistemological value, since to know a term without being able to make 
propositions about it seems only trivially different from not knowing the term at all.  This discussion will come back 
up in Chapter III, section 2, pp 56-57.  So, in coming to know, there is no middle step in which one first becomes 





 Now, this presentation might suggest that there is in fact some non-causal step between 
experience and universal knowledge, namely a universal description of the form “All Fs are G” 
that does not have the causal explanation of universal knowledge.72  I assert that this is not the case 
for two reasons.  First, I see no reason in the text to posit additional, intermediate steps between 
experience and universal knowledge.  Aristotle goes right from one to the other not only in Meta., 
but also in APo., which I will look at shortly.  Second, such an intervening step is something that 
I take never to occur, for it would require that one know that all Fs are G without knowing that all 
Fs are G precisely because they are Fs.  Yet such knowledge seems to be trivially different from 
the experiential knowledge that all F-like things that one has encountered have all been G, since it 
is nothing more than a more general statement of what one has experienced, without any sort of 
explanation to back it up beyond experience.  With universal knowledge, however, a proper 
explanation is entailed, as the claim is not that all observed Fs happen to be G, but that all Fs are 
G by virtue of being Fs.  Thus, it seems that the move beyond experience is one that lands 
immediately on some sort of causal explanation.73  
 So goes the account of experience in Meta. I.1.  In APo. II.19, there remains one 
controversial matter to be discussed.  In describing the progress from experience to universal 
knowledge, Aristotle says that “from experience, or from the whole universal that has come to rest 
in the soul (the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things), there 
comes to be a principle of skill and understanding.”74  The controversy stems from the ambiguity 
 
72 The middle step that I am denying here is distinct from the other middle step of knowing only a concept, 
mentioned above in n71.  Here, the middle step to be denied is one in which one knows in a universal way that Fs 
are G without knowing that any F is G precisely because it is an F.  On my view, once one knows that all Fs are G, 
one knows in a basic way why all Fs are G, namely because it is essential, not coincidental, that all Fs are G. 
73 It should be clarified here that the sort of causal explanation I have in mind here is not the sort of causal explanation 
given by a syllogism.  In the syllogistic sense, the explanation is given by the middle term.  In the sense used here, the 
explanation is simply that all Fs are G not because all Fs are B, and all Bs are G, but more basically because to be G 
it is part of what it means to be F.   





of the word “or” that connects “experience” and “the whole universal that has come to rest in the 
soul.”  Some interpreters take it to mean “or rather,” suggesting that the two terms are distinct 
steps in the process of coming to universal knowledge.75  Others take it to mean “or, in other 
words,” suggesting that the two terms are more or less synonymous.76  It is this latter reading that 
I will defend.   
 The critical step is to handle properly the Greek that Barnes translates as “that has come to 
rest,” ἠρεμήσαντος.  The dominant idea of the Greek word ἠρεμίζειν is that of “making still” or 
“being quiet.”77  Thus, I think the better translation is “the whole universal that has quietly rested 
in the soul.”  This translation will explain both that the man of experience is able to recognize the 
commonality between Callias, Socrates, and the others, and why he cannot yet form the judgment 
that is indicative of universal knowledge.   
 That the universal is in some sense present to the soul suggests that the man of experience 
has had some encounter with the universal, namely as instantiated in the particulars of his 
perceptual experience.  From these encounters, the universal takes up some sort of silent residence 
in the soul of the man of experience.  It is distinctive, however, that at this stage the universal is 
present and quiet.  This key feature of the universal at this stage corresponds to the fact that the 
man of experience cannot yet articulate the universal judgment on which he already has a slight 
 
75 See Bronstein, “Origin and Aim,” and Gregoric and Grgic, “Aristotle’s Notion.” Both explicitly accept this 
“corrective” reading of the “or”.  Also see Butler, “Empeiria in Aristotle.” Butler does not come down hard on the 
issue but seems more sympathetic to this reading than the other.  
76 Hasper and Yurdin, “Between Perception and Scientific Knowledge,” and LaBarge, “Aristotle on Empeiria,” 
support this “epexegetical” reading.  
77 See Henry James Liddell and Robert Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon (Mansfield Centre: Martino 
Publishing, 2013), 354.  This translation can alleviate the concern that motivates Bronstein’s corrective reading of the 
“or” at 100a6.  See David Bronstein, “The Origin and Aim of Posterior Analytics II.19,” Phronesis 57 (2012). 
Bronstein cites Meta I.1, 981a7-12 as establishing that art and science are of the universal, while experience is 
essentially of particulars, so that “experience” and “the universal coming to rest in the soul” need to be distinguished.  
However, if I am right and ἠρεμήσαντος should be read as “having quietly rested,” we can say that the soul has some 





grasp.  In other words, the man of experience has the universal present enough in him so that he 
can sort all the phlegmatic patients into the same folder, but cannot yet identify that their being 
phlegmatic is what makes them to be members of this group.  He, like the universal, must remain 
silent of the matter until universal knowledge is achieved.  With all of this, the most helpful 
translation of 100a6-8 reads “from experience, or, in other words, from the whole universal that 
has quietly rested in the soul (the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all 
those things), there comes to be a principle of skill and understanding.” 
 Now, this account of experience in Aristotle as it currently stands applies best to theoretical 
knowledge.  Elsewhere in the Aristotelian Corpus, however, experience (ἐμπειρία) is named as 
necessary also for productive and practical knowledge.  And in both cases, it is tied to a concept 
that is common also to Hume’s treatment of experience, namely habituation.  And for both 
thinkers, this sort of habitual experience is shared by some non-rational animals.   
 First, Aristotle says that some animals “have but little of connected experience,”78 
suggesting that there is some non-trivial capacity that animals have for keeping memories together 
and using these unified memories to direct action.  Pavel Gregoric and Filip Grgic offer a helpful 
example of what animal experience is like.  “Take the instance of a dog who, wanting to go for a 
walk, brings his leash to the master.”79  In this non-rational activity, perceptions and memories are 
put together in some sort of basic connection¾the leash and the master are associated with going 
for a walk, so bringing the master and the leash together should yield the desired walk.  This dog, 
exercising some version of practical reasoning, could be compared to the novice baker, who knows 
what ingredients go together to make a cake, but does not know why each ingredient is needed nor 
what each ingredient does in the cake.  However, his grasp of the situation is enough to allow him 
 
78 Meta. I.1, 980b27.  





to exercise productive knowledge, for instance, to bake a cake.  In both cases, the dog and the 
baker know what steps to take to get a desired result, but they do not know why the particular parts 
are related as they are.  They know what to do in the particular set of circumstances with which 
they are familiar, but they do not have knowledge that is universal in scope and applicable to all 
particulars that they can recognize as belonging to a given group. 
Hume offers a similar account of experience by way of comparing some aspect of human 
understanding to the way in which animals learn from memory.  He begins by noting that “animals, 
as well as men learn many things from experience,”80 as “experience . . . makes [a dog] answer to 
his name, and infer, from such an arbitrary sound, that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, 
and intend to call him.”81  This is in accord with Aristotle’s observation that some animals share 
in experience.  Hume understands experience to be the process and result of inferring “that the 
same events will always follow from the same causes,”82 which is to say that experience is an 
awareness that two different objects have such a relation, which matches the Aristotelian account 
of experience as generally knowing that F is G.  Additionally, in attributing experience to animals, 
Hume reasonably concludes that “it is impossible that this inference [that like events must follow 
like objects] of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning.”83  This 
corresponds to the Aristotelian account of animal experience as a non-rational process that can 
nevertheless help the experienced animal get the desired result.  
It should be noted here that Hume’s account of experience does not allow for the ascent to 
universal knowledge that we have described in the first part of this section.  Nevertheless, there 
 
80 Enquiry, 70. 
81 Enquiry, 70. 
82 Enquiry, 70. 





remains a salient similarity between both accounts of how animals and unreflective men can 
advance from many memories to practically and productively useful experience.   
  
6. Discursive Activity 
I begin this section by explaining what I mean by “discursive activity.”  For present 
purposes, “discursive activity” is best understood as that mental activity of man that does not 
immediately rely on sense perception, but rather deals in those concepts and propositions that are 
furnished by perception, memory, and experience.  This activity does not include any means of 
going between perception and such discourse, such as induction.  As has been shown, both 
Aristotle and Hume largely concur in the way in which these concepts and propositions have been 
furnished.  Their agreements concerning human knowing extend little beyond this point, but there 
does remain a very narrow conception of discursive activity that is worth mentioning. 
For Hume, the most complex mental activity that humans do is a sort of dealing in concepts 
and conventions, a process of associating ideas “with a certain degree of method and regularity.”84  
Hume argues that there are three such principles, “Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and 
Cause or Effect.”85  Hume does allow the possibility that there exist other principles of association 
between ideas, but he does not allow that there exists an intellectual process beyond the uses of 
principles such as he has described.   
In the next section of his Enquiry, Hume makes an exhaustive distinction of the sorts of 
things that humans know, “Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact.”86  Things of the second sort 
are known by “the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory,”87 that is, they 
 
84 Enquiry, 14. 
85 Enquiry, 14. 
86 Enquiry, 15. 





are the things present to our perception, memory, and experience, albeit Hume will take great pains 
to explain how the associative principle of Cause and Effect can also establish a Matter of Fact. 
Relations of Ideas are “either intuitively or demonstratively certain,”88 and are the objects 
of discursive activity, for they are “discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without 
dependence on what is any where existent in the universe,”89 that is, without any input from 
perception.  In this set of objects, Hume seems to place only the mathematical knowledge¾ 
“Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic”90¾which is indeed one of the subsets of theoretical 
knowledge that Aristotle distinguished in Meta., along with natural science and metaphysics.91  In 
sum, Hume attributes to man’s rational capacities the ability to reason about mathematical 
constructs with absolute certainty. 
None of what Hume includes in his account of discursive activity would be excluded by 
the Aristotelian account.  Comparable to Hume’s dealing in concepts is Aristotle’s dealing in 
universals with deductive reasoning in the syllogism, as this too is done, in itself, without any 
direct reference to perception.  Aristotle defines this dealing in universals early in the APr., saying 
that a “deduction (συλλογισμός) is a discourse in which, certain things being stated, something 
other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so.”92  In other words, a syllogism, 
which is Aristotle’s sole method of deduction (hence the translator using “deduction” as a fair 
translation of συλλογισμός), is a sequence of propositions that entail a conclusion.  Although the 
premises themselves may be known through a process of induction starting in perception, they are 
not treated as relying on perception but are rather used in the same way that one might also use a 
 
88 Enquiry, 15. 
89 Enquiry, 14. 
90 Enquiry, 15. 
91 Meta. VI.1.  Hume’s decision not to include the natural sciences and metaphysics in his account of discursive activity 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 





hypothetical statement or indemonstrable first principle as a premise in a syllogism.  So, while the 
premises of a given syllogism might be propositions learned from experience, when considered as 
parts of the syllogism, the way in which they came to be known is not important, giving Aristotle 
an account of knowing that is independent of perception, as the mathematical sciences are for 
Hume.   
Aristotle also gives an account of mathematical reasoning similar to Hume’s account.  He 
says that mathematics “considers some mathematical concepts qua immovable and qua separable 
from matter.”93  That is to say, math for Aristotle looks at the unchanging¾“immovable”¾ 
principles in things, and considers these principles not as they are embodied in perceptible things 
but as they exist abstracted from all particulars.  This science represents another instance of dealing 
in abstractions, mathematical entities instead of universals, in a way very similar to Hume’s 
“abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number.”94 
Thus far and no further do Aristotle and Hume agree on their accounts of human knowing.  
Both thinkers begin their accounts of knowledge in the perception of concrete particulars and 
advance it through the accumulation of perceptions into experience and allow for at least some 
cognitive activity independent of perception.  In the next chapter, I will show that Hume takes any 
cognitive activity not based in perception to be an ungrounded exercise in conjecture and 
convention. 
 
93 Meta. VI.1, 1026a9f. 






A Failure to Limit the Role of Perception: David Hume’s Epistemic Circle 
 
From Aristotle’s starting point that knowledge arises out of perception and experience, 
Hume departs the company of the Stagirite down a path of more extreme empiricism.  While, as 
we will see in the next chapter, Aristotle limits the role of perception to the beginning of the 
epistemic process, Hume gives ultimate epistemic authority only to perceptions of particulars and 
to mathematical abstractions, with no process of going from the particular to the universal.  Hume 
makes this exclusion to get around the problem that philosophy has, to this point, both included 
such a middle step¾induction¾and failed to arrive at certain and incontrovertible answers.  In 
removing induction, Hume hopes to do away with millennia of philosophical failure.  Hume will 
replace induction not with any sure process of coming to know, but with an appeal to custom, 
which will leave Hume with, it will be shown, a solution no better than the problem that he set out 
to solve. 
 
1. The Problem as Hume Sees It 
Hume extends his criticism of past philosophers to anyone who engaged in metaphysics, 
arguing not that they were doing their investigation poorly, but that they were not investigating at 
all.  “Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of 
metaphysics, that they are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human 
vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the 
craft of popular superstition.”1  His explanation of the empirically verifiable phenomenon that 
 





there are people who do metaphysics is that they seek either vainly to know things greater than 
anything humans can, in fact, know, or to codify superstition or other already accepted prejudices.  
The latter criticism is doubtlessly one that Aristotle would make of some metaphysicians, since 
he, as we have already seen, condemns those thinkers who “had certain predetermined views, and 
were resolved to bring everything into line with them.”2  Pointing out this concord with Aristotle 
takes for granted that Hume’s criticism of superstition has the same root as Aristotle’s criticism of 
predetermined views, namely that investigations should not be done with a conclusion already 
made and not to be changed, even in the light of clear evidence against the assumed conclusion.   
 The former criticism of metaphysics, that it goes beyond the proper scope of human reason, 
is not one that Aristotle shares, and represents a major point of departure for the Humean account 
of human knowing.  Hume’s reckoning that Aristotle’s loftiest intellectual investigation is nothing 
more than vanity shows that a significant difference exists between these two thinkers who both 
argue that knowledge begins in the senses.  What Hume takes to be the remedy for this vanity is 
to stick closely to the only evidence that Hume takes to be proper to human beings¾sense 
impressions.3  Thus, the critical component of Aristotle’s account for going from experience to 
universal knowledge¾induction¾is something that Hume discards.  By discarding this middle 
step, Hume sees no path forward to the result that he here decries, namely, metaphysics.  
Before putting forth this remedy, however, he expresses pessimism that his remedy will 
ever be universally accepted: “In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will 
at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of human reason.”4  Here, 
Hume cites the “frequent disappointment” that metaphysicians must surely feel, since their 
 
2 DC III.7, 306a8-9. 
3 Aristotle also agrees that sense data are proper to human beings, calling it “more knowable to us.” Phys. I.1, 184a17. 





investigation into the ultimate principles of reality have, in the centuries since Aristotle first 
systematically investigated them, not yet been unanimously accepted as long since wholly 
understood.  This comment echoes the complaint of the “abstruse philosophers” that he mentions 
in the beginning of the Enquiry, who “think it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should 
not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism.”5  To 
this reproach, then, Hume offers an explanation, namely that the abstruse search for theoretical 
certainty is a vain one.  Hume, however, does share this desire to have as much certitude as possible 
concerning human knowledge.  In the following section, I will investigate the first sort of certain 
knowledge for which Hume makes room on his famous “fork,” namely “abstract reasoning 
concerning quantity or number [and] experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and 
existence.”6 
 
2. Remnants of Rationality: Dealing in Concepts 
Hume leaves a narrow space for discourse to be done without direct appeal to perceptions.  
This space is cleared by the first prong of the fork, “abstract reasoning concerning quantity or 
number.”7  This pared down version of rationality includes only that theoretical science that, for 
Aristotle, considers physical bodies and their attributes “qua immovable and qua separable from 
matter,”8 that is, mathematics, whose conclusions Hume considers strictly necessary.  The litmus 
test for necessity, and thus for epistemic certainty, that Hume applies is that the negation of any 
necessary conclusion is a contradiction.  The only such example he offers is “[t]hat the cube root 
 
5 Enquiry, 2. 
6 Enquiry, 114.  This pair is essentially the same that Hume names earlier in the Enquiry (15) as “Relations of Ideas 
and Matters of Fact.” We have already dealt with “experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence” 
in Chapter I’s discussion of perception.  
7 Enquiry, 114. 





of 64 is equal to the half of 10, is a false proposition, and can never be distinctly conceived.”9  This 
mathematical certainty stands in contrast to that of the conclusions of the natural sciences, whose 
statements are not necessary in the same way.  Hume offers the following example: “That the sun 
will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, 
than the affirmation, that it will rise.”10  Hume takes the conclusions drawn by natural sciences, 
such as the laws of planetary motions from which one can conclude that the sun will rise tomorrow, 
not to have the necessity of mathematical laws.  Rather, Hume supposes, it is quite possible that 
the future phenomena not be similar to past observations.  So, Hume does allow for conclusions 
that can be drawn without appeal to perception, and that these conclusions have absolute epistemic 
certainty, but he limits such conclusions to the realm of mathematics, calling any other such claims 
to certain reasoning “sophistry and illusion.”11   
As for the customary concepts that replace scholastic concepts such as universals, Hume 
allows that they can be used only in a process of creating ever more imperfect definitions.  His 
example is the deduction “that where there is no property, there can be no injustice”12 is nothing 
more than an unfolding of the customary definition that “explain injustice to be a violation of 
property.”13  Thus, Hume relegates even this dealing in concepts to a place below mathematical 
proof-making.   
In sum, Hume’s account of investigations that are not based immediately in perception 
leave us with little.  Mathematics, for Hume, offers us nothing but non-contradictory statements 
 
9 Enquiry, 113. 
10 Enquiry, 15.  This example is a curious one given Hume’s model for scientific certainty, Newton, whose greatest 
achievement Hume takes to be the formulation of “the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are 
governed and directed.” (8)  Such mathematical laws would seem in fact to lead one to believe that the claim that the 
sun will not rise to-morrow actually does imply a contradiction, namely of these Newtonian laws.  
11 Enquiry, 112. 
12 Enquiry, 113. 





derivable from basic definitions.  Dealing in concepts does the same thing with provisional 
definitions, giving less and less grounded statements as the process goes on.  Thus, the progress of 
human knowledge does not grow greater as man advances from the starting point of perception 
and definitions, but remains flat or, more likely, devolves into superstition and uncertainty.  In the 
next section, I will look at what Hume uses to fill in what intellectual activity exists between the 
two certain prongs of his account of knowledge.  
 
3. Hume’s Remedy: Replace Reason with Custom 
 Perhaps the most important component of Hume’s epistemology is the account given of 
“custom or habit.”14  By “custom,” Hume means those actions we take that are not spurred by a 
process of reasoning; rather, he refers to that principle that is active “wherever the repetition of 
any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation.”15  While 
a word like custom may connote a socially conditioned practice like carving pumpkins at the end 
of October, Hume intends something more like a nonrational force that connects a present thing, 
like it happening to be late October, with another thing, like the need to carve pumpkins.16  By 
expositing custom in this way, Hume expands the scope of actions to which the term applies.  
Particularly, where Aristotle, as we will see in the next chapter, places inductive insight as the step 
past which perception and experience leave the knower, Hume asserts that the step to what we 
think of as knowledge is nothing more than a customary transition, saying that “[a]ll inferences 
 
14 Enquiry, 28. 
15 Enquiry, 28. 
16 I should clarify here that although the common use of the word “custom” suggests some sort of habituation over 
time, Hume’s use of the term seems to cover even spontaneous leaps from perceptions to generalizations, even if such 
a leap is neither habituated nor customary to a given group of people.  H.O. Mounce, “The Idea of a Necessary 
Connection,” Philosophy 60, no. 233 (1985), 384 characterizes this disposition to act beyond the experiential evidence 





from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning.”17  By “reasoning,” Hume here 
seems to mean something like “that mental process by which one has sure and certain grounds for 
asserting what one asserts.”  By claiming that such assertions are grounded only in custom, Hume 
undermines confidence in the knowledge that human beings profess to have about such things.  
The upshot of this undermining is that it explains what Hume takes to be the failure of purportedly 
rational discourse to “have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and 
criticism,”18 since the difference in philosophical answers can, by this account, be reduced to a 
difference in custom. 
 Part and parcel of Hume making custom the bridge between what humans perceive and 
what they purport to know is Hume’s expansion of that part of life that comes before what an 
Aristotelian account would call “universal knowledge.”  Part of this pre-universal experience is 
that of common life or nature, which Hume uses to indicate the demands of living in a bodily 
world.  Some may fear Hume’s destruction of the foundation of knowledge will “destroy all 
action”19 in this common life, but Hume addresses these concerned readers by saying that “[n]ature 
will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever.”20  
Thus, Hume says that not even his account of what humans can really know will not be so 
persuasive as to cause anyone who accepts it to be unable to return to the common life that men 
naturally lead, that is, the life that men lead without the interruption of philosophical reflection.   
 
17 Enquiry, 28. 
18 Enquiry, 2. 
19 Enquiry, 27. 
20 Enquiry, 27.  Douglas Long, “Hume’s ‘Imagination’ Revisited,” Theatre of the World 17 (1998), 128 argues that 
any form of skepticism is mitigated in the way described here: “Scepticism, as I shall argue here, always contained 
the means of its own ‘mitigation’ in the form of recourse to a ‘practical criterion’ for living such as to enable the 
thoughtful individual to remain rooted in everyday life while facing up to the futility of philosophical system-
building.”  In other words, Long’s skeptic does not find universal answers to questions, but rather goes on living with 





 Having asserted that rationality is custom-based and reassured the reader that life can still 
be led, Hume has still to explain what intellectual claims are left.  To those looking for a litmus 
test to determine whether any piece of an intellectual claim is meaningful, Hume suggests that, 
whenever “we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without 
any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that 
supposed idea derived?  And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our 
suspicion.”21  With this claim, Hume gives absolute epistemic authority to perceptions and the 
impressions created by them.  By “impression,” Hume means only that most immediate result of 
a perception, that seeing in the mind exactly what is seen with the eyes, without any action at all 
on the part of the receiver.  There is no other way that sure knowledge can be achieved for Hume: 
either an idea is an impression of a particular thing, or it is, at best, the product of custom.  Only 
the former case can be a sure basis for man’s ultimate claims to knowledge.  Where Aristotelians 
might posit a universal that can be induced or abstracted from the particular thing, Hume allows 
that only the most immediate impression, with all the particularity (that is, non-universality) of the 
object perceived, can be said to have any certainty about it.  The latter steps in which the perceiver 
applies customary reasoning do not have logical necessity for Hume and therefore cannot be taken 
as universally true.  By erasing such a problematic middle, Hume has what he takes to be an 
incontrovertible foundation for reasoning.  
 Having stripped human knowledge of its claim to know more than impressions, Hume still 
has to account for the nontrivial discourse done by human beings in ways that are not done by 
other perceiving animals.  To explain this discourse, as already mentioned in Chapter I, he appeals 
to Relations of Ideas, and to custom.  In this way, Hume grounds a large part of distinctively human 
 





intellectual activity in something that distinctly cannot reach universal truths, thereby expanding 
the role that pre-universal activity has in the life of the human person.  Particularly, Hume is able 
to reduce three significant philosophical connections to non-necessary custom, namely universals, 
identity through time, and causality.  When talking of the connection that people infer between 
cause and effect and take to be necessary, or determined, Hume says that “[t]his connection, 
therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition . . . is the sentiment or impression, 
from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection.”22  It seems not unfair to extend 
this characterization of connection as made out of emotion to the other forms of connection that 
elsewhere Hume reduces to sentiment, as universals connect distinct particulars to one species and 
identity through time connects perceptions perceived at different times to the same perceived 
individual. 
Hume’s treatment of resemblance and contiguity in the Enquiry are both brief, so we will 
consult Hume’s earlier work to fill the missing space.  In the Enquiry, Hume offers how “picture 
naturally leads our thoughts to the original”23 to exemplify resemblance; and for contiguity, his 
initial treatment extends no further than to say that “the mention of one apartment in a building 
naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others.”24  He gives a slightly fuller 
treatment of these two principles of association early in his Treatise on Human Nature, in which 
he says that  
 
in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily 
from one idea to any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient 
bond and association. ’Tis likewise evident, that as the senses, in changing their objects, are 
necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to each other, the 
 
22 Enquiry, 50. 
23 Enquiry, 14. 





imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of 
space and time in conceiving its objects.25   
 
Hume’s example for resemblance given in the Enquiry suggests an analogous relationship 
between the thing perceived (the picture) and the thing associated (the original) which is unlike 
the relationship between a particular and a concept or universal.  However, when he says that 
perceiving one thing leads the mind “to any other [idea] that resembles it,” Hume can be read to 
say that seeing one dog, for instance, leads one to think of other dogs that one has seen, or to think 
of some idea of dog in general, which would be nothing more than a customary image of dogs, 
and which would take the place filled in Aristotelian thought by the essential universal.26  Similarly 
with contiguity, Hume’s example in the Enquiry of being made to think of an apartment building 
when one thinks of an apartment in that building, does not give as full an account of this principle 
of association as can be found with similar brevity in the Treatise.  There, Hume explicitly 
mentions both space and time as dimensions in which a thing can be thought of as being 
contiguous.  In this way, Hume suggests, identity over time is something customarily associated 
with different perceptions, although not anything itself properly perceived, and thus not something 
itself properly known.  Thus, Hume is able to preserve that aspect of human discourse that 
Aristotelians would preserve with form, that thing that stays the same in an object while the matter 
is in flux, with his understanding of contiguity as a customary principle of association. 
 
25 David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 13. 
26 See Aristotle, Categories, trans. J.L. Ackrill, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume I, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2, 1a20-22, 1a29-1b1, where Aristotle distinguishes the essential 
universal from the accidental universal, albeit not by those names: “Of things there are: (a) some are said of a subject 
but are not in any subject.  For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject . . . . (c) 
Some are both said of a subject and in a subject.  For example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is also said of 
a subject, knowledge-of-grammar.”  Most particularly, I refer to the abstracted essential universal as grasped by the 
intellect, which Aristotle mentions in Aristotle, On the Soul, trans. J.A. Smith, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, 
Volume I, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), II.5, 417b23: “what knowledge 





Hume’s account of causality, on the other hand, is well fleshed out in the Enquiry, and 
needs only an exposition.27  Hume is very clear that causality is not something that we can perceive, 
and thus not something that we can know.  Rather, “we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover 
any thing but one event following another.”28  In other words, there is nothing in the perception of 
one event following another that allows the perceiver to conclude that there is any relationship 
between the two adjacent events, since it is perfectly conceivable that the two events be completely 
unrelated, as the increased sales in ice cream in the summer are not related to, although connected 
in time with, the rise in instances of drowning that also occur in the summer.  In light of the 
possibility of such events, related in time but not in causality, Hume laments that “men still 
entertain a strong propensity to believe, that they penetrate farther into the power of nature and 
perceive something like a necessary connection between the cause and the effect.”29   
Having disarmed the possibility of discovering how causes are related to their effects, 
Hume moves to do away with arguments from effects to cause.  When discussing providence, or 
any investigation into what the future might hold on the basis of some steady cause of its being the 
way that it is (providence being the situation in which God, in his power and benevolence, makes 
the universe to be the way that it is), Hume asserts that “[t]he cause must be proportioned to the 
effect; and if we exactly and precisely proportion it, we shall never find in it any qualities, that 
 
27 Giving such an exposition, however, is no easy task.  See Justin Broackes, “Did Hume Hold a Regularity Theory of 
Causation?” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 1 (1993).  Broackes describes the debate as between a 
regularity theory of causation (in which causality is just a description of what regularly occurs) and a reading in which 
Hume affirms that causes exist but denies that we can know them.  Also see Katherin A. Rogers, “Hume on Necessary 
Causal Connections,” Philosophy 66, no. 258 (1991).  Rogers offers three different ways that Hume can be read to 
understand causality, as denying that it exists at all, treating it as a conditioned belief, or allowing that it exists while 
denying that we can know it.  Also see P. Kyle Stanford, “The Manifest Connection: Causation, Meaning, and David 
Hume,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 40, no. 3 (2002).  Stanford defends a fourth option, that Hume took 
causal language to be meaningless according to his semantic theory that meaning is dependent on perception, and 
causality is never perceived.  At the very least, Hume’s text suggests that his clearest claim is that we cannot know 
anything about causal connections, and so we should say nothing about them.  
28 Enquiry, 49. 





point farther, or afford an inference concerning any other design or performance.”30  The relevant 
thrust of what Hume here says is that any argument from an effect to a cause would, at the most, 
allow one to conclude that there is a being that can cause exactly the effect before one’s eyes, 
without allowing one to conclude that the cause has the power to do so again, or to do anything 
else at any other time.  Thus, any conclusions drawn about the cause of a particular event are so 
narrow as to hardly count as any new knowledge at all.31  A natural consequence of this narrow 
conception of causal inference is that Aristotelian natural science is ruled out, for Aristotle asserts 
at the beginning of the Physics that “[w]hen the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have 
principles, causes, or elements, it is through acquaintanceship with these that knowledge and 
understanding is attained.”32  With causes being unknowable, natural science joins metaphysics as 
a branch of theoretical knowledge discarded by Hume’s epistemology.  “In vain,” Hume asserts, 
“do you pretend to have learned [the object of natural science, namely] the nature of bodies from 
your past experience.”33 
Part of Hume’s disarming of causal inference is a scaling back of what exactly can be 
perceived.  Hume posits a distinction between properties of objects, some of which are plain to the 
eye and some of which are hidden.  He offers bread as an example, saying that “senses inform us 
of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of 
 
30 Enquiry, 94. 
31 This is, I think, the same reason that statistics-driven analytics has not taken off in football the way that it has in 
baseball.  A given play in baseball starts in exactly the same way, making it much more reasonable to compare the 
present at-bat to those that have taken place in the past, and to make probability claims and subsequent strategic 
decisions with reasonable expectation of success.  A given football play, on the other hand, has many more variables 
at the start¾offensive and defensive formation, personnel, play-calls, down and distance, game situation, etc.¾, 
which makes the amount of past situations like it from which to get helpful data very small, perhaps even non-existent.  
Similarly, Hume would say, any knowledge gained from observing a particular event is so affected by the specific 
circumstances of the event that it cannot be fairly compared to a future event with similar, but inevitably different (in 
at least some small way) circumstances. 
32 Phys. I.1, 184a10-12.  Hume’s replacing Form with other principles of association (resemblance and contiguity) 
also serve as destructive of Aristotle’s natural science, which relies on there being repeating natures really in things, 
and not just customary associations made by people pretending to gain real knowledge.  





those qualities, which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body.”34  This notion of a 
power unobservable under any circumstances may well have been a premature claim.  At least 
those qualities that make bread nutritious¾its having certain constituent compounds that can be 
observed with the right equipment (that, in fairness, may not have existed when the Enquiry was 
published), and that those compounds have been observed, again with the right equipment, to bring 
about effects constitutive of human health---can in fact be perceived.  Louis Groarke has gone so 
far as to say that “[Hume] assumes, wrongly, as it turns out, that the power in bread which causes 
nourishment is eternally hidden from our understanding.”35  With this example having been 
handled, we see that Hume does not give enough credit to what the human being can know by 
perception, even without appeal to induction or universals. 
Hume attempts to buffer his explanation that humans cannot know the secret powers and 
natures of substances with a thought experiment about discovering causality that ultimately begs 
the question, and thereby fails to support his radical empiricism.  Hume gives this example right 
before he introduces custom as the non-rational means by which human beings claim to have 
knowledge of causality.  It is supposed to show that human beings have no means of bridging the 
gap between perceptions and claims of knowledge.  Hume begins: 
Suppose a person, endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden 
into this world; he would, indeed, immediately observe a continual succession of objects, and one event 
following another; but he would not be able to discover any thing farther.  He would not, at first, by any 
reasoning, be able to reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular powers, by which all natural 
operations are performed, never appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one 
event, in one instance, precedes another, that therefore one is the cause of the other.  And in a word, such a 
person, without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of 
fact, or be assured of any thing beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses.36   
 
 
34 Enquiry, 21. See Stanford, “Manifest Connection,” 347.  Stanford argues that this appeal to secret powers is not an 
attempt to admit that causality may refer to something in the real world, but is rather allowing that such unperceived 
qualities may exist.  Stanford would deny, however, that these secret powers could have any causal power according 
to Hume’s understanding of it.  
35 Louis Groarke, An Aristotelian Account of Induction: Getting Something from Nothing (Ithaca, McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2009), 47.  





Of note is that Hume’s reasonable man is given “the strongest faculties of reason and reflection” 
and, presumably, the standard human senses whereby he can “observe a continual succession of 
objects.”37  Since “the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never 
appear to the senses,”38 Hume thinks that he is licensed to conclude that such a man would never 
“be able to reach the idea of cause and effect” from perceptions and reason alone.   
So, Hume has given this man the two tools that he talks about elsewhere, namely 
“experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact an existence”39¾perception¾and “abstract 
reasoning concerning quantity and number”40¾reasoning as Hume understands it.  Thus, Hume’s 
skeptical minimalism is not extended to the senses nor to the reliability of human reasoning and 
logic as it is to the ability to discern the general from the particular.  Thus, with this selectively 
stripped back example being the starting point for Hume’s investigation into what humans can 
know, Hume seems destined from the start to arrive at the conclusions that he does, not because 
he is aimed straight at the obvious truth of the matter, but because he has very cleverly smuggled 
his conclusion into the very premise of his argument.  Thus, we should be on guard that Hume’s 
rejection of any path between perception and reasoning is not something concluded from the 
premises of this discussion, but rather something smuggled into the premises themselves.  This 
example, then, serves not as a proof but rather as a restatement of Hume’s position.  
We need now to investigate what Hume systematically excludes from his consideration, in 
other words, what power he does not think his reasonable man has.  Hume rejects any process, 
outside of contingent connections of custom, that makes a singular, unified claim about a plurality 
of perceptions.  A particularly helpful example of discovering and making such a statement can be 
 
37 Enquiry, 27. 
38 Enquiry, 27. 
39 Enquiry, 114. 





found in positivist political philosophy.  When talking about rules and habits that people habitually 
follow and do, respectively, H.L.A. Hart offers the following example of an observer making a 
general claim about what he observes: “After a time [an] external observer may, on the basis of 
the regularities observed, correlate deviation [from an observed pattern of behavior] with hostile 
reaction, reproofs, or punishments, and be able to predict with a fair measure of success, and to 
assess the chances that a deviation from the group’s behavior will meet with hostile reaction or 
punishment.”41  In other words, the observer is able to piece together from repeated observations 
of like phenomena an account of future behavior, given that the things he is observing are in fact 
creatures who, like the observer himself, tend to do the same sort of thing over and over again. 
It seems that Hume leaves no room at all for the inference of a rule from observation, even 
in cases in which the observer could at a later time find hard evidence that such a rule exists (for 
instance, the observer could later find in a lawbook the rule that requires the behavior that he 
observes), for such an inference would rely, on Hume’s account, on a connection “which we feel 
in the mind [and is nothing more than] a customary transition of the imagination from one object 
to its usual attendant.”42  That such an epistemic process as this inference, which can in this case 
of politics be empirically verified, is omitted from Hume’s account of knowing shows that he 
conceives of only one way¾direct perception¾to get to knowledge, at the exclusion of another 
way that departs from perception and, in the case of observing and inferring rules, can be verified 
by perception. 
Underpinning Hume’s rejection of any purported knowledge gained by departing from 
perception is a rejection43 of the proposition that the universe is consistent and predictable.  Hume 
 
41 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 89. 
42 Enquiry, 50. 
43 Kenneth Winkler, “The New Hume,” The Philosophical Review 100, no. 4 (1991), 543 opts for an agnostic reading 





says as much when he explains why he cannot accept the epistemic authority of claims about the 
future or about similar cases (which, since these claims would necessarily be verified at a time yet 
to come, can be taken also as claims about the future).  Hume takes any such claim about the future 
implicitly to take the form of a syllogism whose first premise is that a certain action has occurred 
many times in such circumstances in the past and whose conclusion is that the action will occur in 
like circumstances in the future.  Concerning the intermediate premise, Hume says that “[t]here is 
a required medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn 
by reasoning or argument.  What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension.”44   
Of course, the content of this medium through which the induction passes is easy enough 
to formulate, namely that the world is consistent and predictable, that things will occur in the future 
as they did in the past, at least ceteris paribus.  What passes Hume’s comprehension is how such 
a premise can be accepted.  Since there is no lawbook of nature that any man can consult, there is, 
on Hume’s account, no perception on which such a claim can be based.  We now turn to how 
Hume plans to continue the possibility of intellectual discourse. 
As we have seen, Hume uses custom to replace universals, identity through time, and 
causality, concepts that enable discourse beyond the describing of perceptions and conveying of 
emotions.  Hume accomplishes this reduction by doing away with induction and by placing custom 
as the bridge between experience and discourse, saying that “[a]ll inferences from experience, 
therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning.”45  Thus, the ultimate grounds of all that we 
think and the way in which we come to think what we think is not any sure process of reasoning 
 
world is regular in the way it is.  This is not to deny that there is such a thing, but merely not to believe in it.”  In point 
of fact, however, such agnosticism amounts to a denial for the purposes of advancing to universal knowledge.  
44 Enquiry, 22. 





to necessary conclusions, but rather a contingent process of agreement among large groups of 
people to reach conclusions that easily could have gone otherwise. 
 
 
4. Where We Are Left 
Hume, in his attempt to save us from the arrogance and superstition of the metaphysicians, 
has left us with nothing but custom and a poorly grounded certainty that there is nothing we can 
know with certainty beyond the immediate impressions of sense data.  In other words, he has left 
us no better than he found us, having replaced superstition, which Hume takes to be ungrounded 
with a system built on custom that is taken to be good enough to preserve the common life, and 
the supposed arrogance of the metaphysicians is replaced by an unwavering confidence that would 
“[c]ommit . . . to the flames”46 anything that does not fit the chosen criteria of his enquiry.   
That we are left in the same place would be excusable, albeit unfortunate, if the path by 
which we returned were a reasonable one.  However, it seems that Hume’s criteria are not subjected 
to the same scrutiny as is the ability to go from particular sense data to universal claims, and this 
uncertain foundation does great damage to the credibility of his later conclusions.  Particularly, 
why the senses escape similar scrutiny is unclear.  Bealer suggests that this special treatment of 
the senses is one of what he calls “starting-points intuitions,”47 namely that “a person’s experiences 
and/or observations comprise a person’s prima facie evidence.”48  The trouble that empiricists like 
Hume encounter is that intuitions,49 including starting-points intuitions, are not admissible as 
 
46 Enquiry, 114. 
47 George Bealer and P.F. Strawson, “The Incoherence of Empiricism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volumes 66 (1992),106. 
48 Bealer and Strawson, “Incoherence,” 99. 
49 Bealer, “Incoherence,” 104 goes to great lengths to define intuition as “intellectual seeming” as distinct from 





prima facie evidence by ruling of their own starting point.  Hume’s appeal to “the force and 
vivacity”50 of perception is hardly sufficient to avoid such an inconsistency.  In short, Hume’s 
accepted epistemic process of sensation (and mathematical deduction) are not so much found 
impervious to his skepticism as they are systematically protected from it. 
A similar point can be made with reference to the final lines of the Enquiry.  It seems clear 
that the claims of Hume’s work are themselves neither “experimental reasoning concerning matter 
of fact and existence”51 that can be verified by immediate sense data nor self-evident “abstract 
reasoning concerning quantity or number,”52 and are thus themselves fit to be thrown out.   
 
5. One Response to Hume’s Skepticism 
Having seen that Hume’s rejection of necessary conclusions in favor of exclusive sense 
perceptions is not an internally coherent starting point, it can be added that Hume’s claim that any 
move from perception to universal statements is nothing more than an unwarranted extension of 
perceptions is not one that he consistently applies, even within the Enquiry.  Rather, it seems to be 
a belief that he, on the one hand, upholds when convenient for his attack against metaphysics and, 
on the other, drops when attacking faith traditions other than his own.  Hume demonstrates this 
inconsistency twice,53 first when discussing miracles such as the resurrection of Christ,54 and 
second when attacking the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation.55  The former instance will be 
left aside, as there is no shortage of literature discussing Hume and miracles.  The latter matter of 
 
50 Enquiry, 10. 
51 Enquiry, 114. 
52 Enquiry, 114. 
53 Both of these inconsistencies are also pointed out in Groarke, Aristotelian Account, 51-55.  
54 Enquiry, 76. 





transubstantiation will be briefly investigated, however, to show that Hume does not consistently 
apply his philosophical principles.   
Hume condemns as irrational the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, that bread and 
wine become the Body and Blood of Christ during the Mass despite undergoing no changes in 
appearance.  Hume’s argument against such a claim rests on the relative reliability of different 
types of evidence.  For transubstantiation, the evidence is “in the testimony of the apostles, who 
were eye-witnesses to those miracles,”56 which Hume takes to be “less than the evidence for the 
truth of our senses.”57  In other words, the sensory evidence that suggests that no change has taken 
place should not be overruled by the evidence of millenia-old testimony. 
The soundness of the argument aside,58 this account runs into trouble when one considers 
what Hume says about the hidden powers of particular things.  In discussing the limits of 
perception, Hume says that nature “has afforded to us only the knowledge of a few superficial 
qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles, on which the influence 
of these objects entirely depends.”59  These “secret powers”60 cannot be known by man through 
 
56 Enquiry, 72. 
57 Enquiry, 73. 
58 Michael Levine, “Belief in Miracles: Tillotson’s Argument against Transubstantiation as a Model for Hume,” 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 23, no. 3 (1998), 126-27, 133.  He points out that Hume’s argument 
is in fact not sound.  He presents Hume’s argument as follows: (1) Testimony must provide evidence that is less 
reliable than direct experience, (2) Testimony supports belief in transubstantiation; direct experience contradicts it, 
Therefore (3) there is better evidence against transubstantiation than for it, so it should not be believed.  Premise (2), 
Levine notes, “is false and therefore the argument he presents is unsound,” because the doctrine of transubstantiation 
does not claim that the senses should be able to detect the change in substance.  
59 Enquiry, 21. 





perception or, Hume supposes, through investigation,61 and thus, that feature whereby, for 
instance, “the bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me,”62 cannot be known.   
To apply this doctrine of secret powers to the case of transubstantiation, however, poses a 
serious problem.  It seems inconsistent to say, on the one hand, that no significant change can 
occur without perceptible changes occurring concomitantly (as he does in the case against 
transubstantiation) and that secret powers can be different in the same things that “may be only in 
appearance similar.”63  If it is the case that things can appear to be the same and yet possess 
different secret powers, Hume does not have the grounds to reject the doctrine of transubstantiation 
at all, and certainly not with the vehemence whereby he calls it “a doctrine, so little worthy of a 
serious refutation.”64  Rather, it would suit Hume better to be like his “wise man [who] proportions 
his belief to the evidence”65 and withhold judgment on the matter.   
That Hume did not withhold judgment on the matter suggests that, at least with this 
particular matter of transubstantiation, Hume was participating in an intellectual exercise but rather 
a volitional one, in which he chose not on the basis of evidence but on the basis of something else, 
perhaps emotion or belief, to mount an argument against Catholic doctrine.  Bringing this 
inconsistency into the light of the previous section, in which it was made clear that the starting 
point of Hume’s empiricism cannot be consistently applied to his own thought, it seems that 
 
61 Groarke, Aristotelian Account, 51.  He points out that this supposition is factually incorrect: “The easiest way to 
undermine his stance is to simply point out that although he correctly believed that the physical world we interact with 
is determined by a corpuscular substratum (molecules, atoms, elementary particles, etc.), he was wrong to assume we 
could never come to know anything about the nature of that corpuscular realm. Indeed, the history of modern science 
seems to suggest just the opposite. Contemporary physicists, equipped with high-speed particle accelerators, lasers, 
electron microscopes, spectroscopes, computers, and a whole panoply of technical and mathematical aids are arguably 
able to test and probe the nature of atomic and even subatomic events. We can thus know the “secret powers” or 
“hidden essences” that cause the properties of things we actually perceive, and Hume’s take on induction is therefore 
factually wrong.” 
62 Enquiry, 21. 
63 Enquiry, 21. 
64 Enquiry, 72. 





Hume’s philosophical endeavor is ultimately one that cannot satisfy the question of how 
meaningful discourse arises from sense perception.  Given his common starting point with other 
great thinkers of Western philosophy, including Aristotle, this failure could come as a discouraging 
surprise.  To combat this disappointment, we will now return to that starting point common to 






The Necessarily Limited Role of Perception: Aristotle’s Peculiar Insight 
 
This final chapter will explain the part of Aristotle’s account of human knowing that 
extends beyond perception and reaches all the way to the first principles of particular sciences.  
Aristotle’s account of induction is of particular interest, even though he never offers a systematic 
account of it.1  I will start, however, with a response to a potential rationalist objection, namely 
that such a non-discursive rational activity like induction is not possible, and that the only true 
reasoning is discursive in form, like the syllogism.    
 
1. Possibility of Non-discursive Rational Activity 
Although Hume does not give epistemic authority to knowledge gained from observation 
and what he takes to be customary generalizations, he does acknowledge the legitimacy of 
reasoning of a different sort, which he calls “abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number.”2 
A similar although not analogous3 sort of discursive reasoning can also be found in Aristotle in the 
form of the syllogism.  The thrust of this “rationalist objection” is that all knowledge is of this 
form, that is, discursive, so there is no way to advance from perception to knowledge. 
 
1 Groarke, Aristotelian Account, 5-7. Groarke notes that Aristotle himself seems to assume that his readers have a 
working understanding of induction already. See Aristotle, Topics, trans. W.A. Pickard-Cambridge, in The Complete 
Works of Aristotle, Volume I, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), VIII.1, 157a6-7: 
“What sort of process induction is is obvious.” 
2 Enquiry, 114.  
3 The proper Aristotelian analogue to Hume’s “abstract reasoning concerning quantity and number” is mathematics, 
not the syllogism.  The syllogism is appropriate for the discussion here, however, because it entails the same sort of 
logical necessity that Hume seeks for sure reasoning, namely that the negation of a syllogism’s conclusion entails a 
logical impossibility, a direct contradiction of either the premises or still more basic principles.  Such more basic 
principles for Hume would be something like numerical identity, as would be violated if one were to conclude that 3 





As we have seen in the second chapter, Hume considers neither metaphysics nor natural 
science to be a legitimate intellectual endeavor, but he does regard mathematics as impervious to 
the criticisms that he levies against the other two forms of Aristotelian theoretical knowledge.  
However, when pushed to give an account of what gives mathematical items their unique standing, 
Hume says only that “the ideas of [the mathematical sciences], being sensible, are always clear 
and determinate, the smallest distinction between them is immediately perceptible, and the same 
terms are still expressive of the same ideas, without ambiguity or variation.”4  In other words, 
Hume only says that, once we accept and sufficiently grasp the meanings of mathematical terms, 
their meanings are clear enough that there is no possible space for confusion or error.  However, 
beyond this appeal to clarity and a later appeal to the success of mathematical reasoning,5 Hume 
does not seem to offer any grounding for these mathematical arguments.  There seems to be no 
reason to prefer mathematics, on Hume’s account, to any other system of rules that can produce 
internally consistent results.   
 Now, if Hume were only claiming that mathematics is a system that produces internally 
consistent results, his account of mathematics would not be problematic.  Such internal consistency 
would be trivial, since it has no connection to the world of perception.  However, Hume seems to 
think that mathematics has something to say about the actual operation of the world that we 
perceive, that it makes a nontrivial contribution to what we know.6  Thus, there seems to be some 
need for a way to go between the perceived phenomena of, for instance, planetary movement and 
the universal truths of such movement stated as mathematical laws.  However, as we saw last 
 
4 Enquiry, 39.  
5 See Enquiry, 40.  There, Hume appeals to the complexity and the certainty of geometric proofs to demonstrate their 
superiority to arguments used in ethical philosophy.  
6 See Enquiry, 8.  Hume takes as an example the success that Newton had in formulating laws of astronomy, which 






chapter, such a way between¾i.e. induction¾is exactly what Hume makes unavailable.  Thus, 
the model for his philosophy, the success of Newtonian physics,7 is undermined by the conclusions 
of Hume’s philosophical endeavor.  It seems then, on his own account, that Hume does not leave 
us with any more than he found us with, he has in fact taken away even that which he took to be 
most certain, namely the apparent progress of Newtonian science. With all inference from 
observation reduced to custom and all relations of ideas confined to definition and tautology, 
discovering the laws of nature seems to be impossible.    
As it happens, Aristotle himself considers a similar objection early in APo.  A brief 
exposition of his dealing with this objection will suffice to get out of it, and to show us a path 
beyond Hume.  Aristotle argues that all syllogistic demonstrations “depend on what is primitive 
and non-demonstrable”8 and that “neither is all understanding demonstrative, but in the case of the 
first principles it is non-demonstrable¾and that this is necessary is evident.”9  These immediate 
first principles10 are the foundation of all deductions, but they cannot themselves be proven.  That 
such principles cannot be demonstrated by a syllogism is not, however, an argument against such 
principles.  If these principles could be shown as the conclusion of an argument, then those 
premises by which they were proven would, in fact, be prior to what we had taken (mistakenly) as 
first principles, and one would be led to wonder whether or not these new principles were 
themselves the sort of things of which an argument can be given.  The notion of first principles is 
put forth, then, to defend against those who say “that we are led back ad infinitum on the grounds 
that we would not understand what is posterior because of what is prior if there are no primitives 
 
7 Enquiry, 8-9.  Here, Hume hopes to apply a method analogous to Newton’s in physics to reach a similarly 
incontrovertible philosophy.  
8 APo. I.2, 71b26-27. 
9 APo. I.3, 72b19-20. 
10 The Greek that I chose, for clarity’s sake, to translate as “first principles” is ἄμεσος, meaning literally “without a 





. . . for it is impossible to go through infinitely many things.”11  The alternative to accepting such 
indemonstrable principles is to admit that all deductive arguments are based on nothing at all, a 
position that Aristotle rejects.12  Thus, we are left here with essentially a claim that knowledge is 
possible, and that we can reach knowledge of first principles by some means other than deductive 
argument.  
It seems that here Aristotle has in mind first principles that give us substantive knowledge 
about the subject matter of a given field of inquiry, such as “man is a rational animal” for zoology 
or “planets are celestial bodies near earth” for astronomy,13 rather than the first principles of 
reasoning in general, like the Principle of Non-Contradiction.14  For the former sorts of principles, 
however, it is still not yet said how exactly these principles come to be known.  We now turn to 
such an account of how such knowledge comes to be.  
 
2. Aristotelian Induction 
We have seen responses to two possible objections against the possibility of getting 
knowledge from perception: Hume’s objection from below in Chapter II, that no such upward 
movement is possible on account of human limitations, and the rationalist objection in the previous 
section that nothing can count as knowledge except for deductive conclusions.  Now we will 
consider how, in Aristotle’s account, knowledge rises from and goes beyond the act of perception.  
The critical part of this discussion is to notice that it is not by magic that Aristotle grasps universal 
knowledge from particular experiences.  Whereas Hume could not make the move from universal 
 
11 APo. I.3, 72b8-9. 
12 “Now some think that because one must understand the primitives there is no understanding at all; others that there 
is, but that there are demonstrations of everything.  Neither of these views is either true or necessary.” APo. I.3 72b5-
7. 
13 These examples are from Gasser-Wingate “Induction and First Principles,” 3.  





to particular without appeal to custom, we will see that Aristotle offers a reasonable path from the 
sensible to the intelligible. 
 Let us start with some general accounts of induction.  Aristotle explicitly says very little 
about induction, often mentioning it in passing and taking for granted that his reader understands 
the matter thoroughly, as we have already seen him say in the Top that “what sort of process 
induction is, is obvious.”15  He is clear in the beginning of APo. that induction is “proving the 
universal through the particular’s being clear.”16  That is to say, induction goes from the perception 
of particular things, which was discussed in detail in Chapter I and which is not universal 
knowledge, to universal knowledge, which the unperceivable universal.17  Thus, the inductive 
process seems to be a sort of move in which one concludes that what has been perceived to be the 
case for a particular18 (or for a set of particulars) is the case for all things that are relevantly similar 
to those perceived particulars.  We also had occasion to see in Chapter I Aristotle’s implicit 
mention of induction in the ascent to knowledge at APo. II.19, when “from experience, or, in other 
words, from the whole universal that has quietly rested in the soul (the one apart from the many, 
whatever is one and the same in all those things), there comes to be a principle of skill and 
understanding.”19  This move from experience of particulars to a principle of universal knowledge 
is precisely what induction is.  
The same sort of move occurs, again unmentioned, in the ascent to knowledge that Aristotle 
describes in the beginning of Meta.  The Philosopher says that “art arises when from many notions 
 
15 Top. VIII.1, 157a6-7. 
16 APo. I.1, 71a9. 
17 APo. I.31, 87b31-32: “It is impossible to perceive what is universal and holds in every case.” 
18 Richard D. McKirahan, Jr. “Aristotelian Epagage in Prior Analytics 2.21 and Posterior Analytics I.1,” Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 21, no. 1 (1983), 9 is clear that Aristotle considers as inductive even conclusions made from 
a single observed particular, citing Aristotle’s example at APo. I.31 88a12-17 in which one would be able to know 
universally how magnifying glasses work by seeing up close the operation of only one.  





gained by experience one universal judgment about similar objects is produced.”20  This claim is 
in line with what we have just seen in APo, although Aristotle here mentions two different 
components worth discussing.  He says that it is often not just one particular that is the source of 
the induction, but rather “many notions gained by experience,” which should calm any fears that 
Aristotle is sanctioning the drawing of universal conclusions from clearly insufficient grounds.  
Second, Aristotle introduces a necessary diachronic component, as the “many notions gained by 
experience” make it evident that there is need for past notions21 to be remembered and organized.  
Such memory and organization will be discussed later in the final section of the chapter.  For now, 
it is sufficient to note that this move mentioned in Meta. is the same as the one mentioned in the 
APo., namely induction, with the added specifications that the antecedents of the move are not just 
one percept, but many experiential notions. 
With this general picture in mind, let us now turn to Aristotle’s famous rout simile at the 
end of APo., in which Aristotle serves as an image of coming to know the universal through 
experience with the particulars.  When considering how ideas first come to be in the mind, he says 
that  
thus the states [of having a principle of skill and of understanding in the mind] neither belong to us in a 
determinate form, nor come about from other states that are more cognitive; but they come about from 
perception¾as in a battle when a rout occurs, if one man makes a stand another does and then another, until 
a position of strength is reached.  And the soul is such as to be capable of undergoing this.22   
 
Here, Aristotle makes it clear that, although rounding out one’s knowledge by having a full account 
of causes is a process that involves deductive reasoning, the acquisition of the basic principles that 
will furnish those deductions come about not from “states that are more cognitive”¾that is, from 
 
20 Meta. I.1, 981a6-7. 
21 The Greek word translated as “notions” is ἐννοημάτων, literally rendered as “things had in one’s mind.”  This seems 
to be a general term that encompasses others, such as perceptual images, memories, and primitive experiential concepts 
(such as the one has whereby one knows that a treatment is good for Callias, Socrates, and others like them but does 
not know that it is because they are phlegmatic).  





states of preexisting knowledge¾but rather from perceptions.23  Before philosophizing about this 
very difficult passage, however, there are some matters of translation with which to deal.  
 Most prominently, the phrase translated as “until a position of strength is reached” is the 
subject of a great deal of debate.  Most Greek texts read “ἕως ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν ἦλθεν,” literally, “until it 
comes to an ἀρχή.”  Ἀρχή is rendered variously as “a starting point”24 or something like “original 
configuration”25 or “initial formation.”26  I am most sympathetic to Barnes’s decision to emend 
ἀρχήν to ἀλκήν, “a position of strength,” as it fits in sensibly with the battle image and 
communicates the basic point that some new and unmoving piece of knowledge is attained.  The 
“starting point” translations of ἀρχήν accomplish more or less the same thing, as we still end up 
with a new and unmoving piece of knowledge, but the word’s fit into the simile is much weaker 
than Barnes’s alternative.  
We need now to settle here exactly what sort of knowledge we are getting in this ascent, 
especially as it is portrayed in APo.  Several readers have noticed that Aristotle seems to go back 
and forth between concepts and principles as the final achievement of this ascent.27  Thus, we need 
 
23 Aristotle considers perception to be something cognitive¾a γνῶσις¾as the discussion in Chapter I makes clear, 
but perception is certainly not the same sort of cognitive state as universal knowledge.  The task of this section is to 
spell out how such a primitive γνῶσις can give rise to significantly more sophisticated ones.  See Greg Bayer, “Coming 
to Know Principles in Posterior Analytics II.19,” Apeiron 30, no. 2 (1997), 114.  
24 J.H. Lesher, “‘Just as in Battle’: The Simile of the Rout in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics ii.19,” Ancient Philosophy 
30 (2010), 95; Bronstein, “Origin and Aim,” 50; and Zeev Perelmuter, “Nous and Two Kinds of Episteme in Aristotle’s 
Posterior Analytics,” Phronesis 55, no. 3 (2010), 245.  Lesher takes this phrase not to be part of the rout simile but to 
apply to the larger discussion about knowledge¾it is the process of knowing that reaches a starting point, not the 
soldiers.  
25 Bayer, “Coming to Know,” 124.  
26 Peter Adamson, “Posterior Analytics 2.19: A Dialogue with Plato?” Bulletin - Institute of Classical Studies 54, 
supplement 107 (2011), 12-13.  Adamson interprets the rout simile as presenting a Platonic view of recollection that 
Aristotle is modifying in the rest of the passage.  While Adamson makes a compelling case that Aristotle is engaging 
with ideas from various Platonic dialogues, I am not convinced that the rout simile needs to be read in the way that he 
suggests.  
27 Concepts are single terms, such as “Man,” and principles refer to composite propositions, such as “Man is a rational 
animal.”  Perelmuter, “Nous and Two Kinds,” makes a great deal about this inconsistency and argues that Aristotle 
has two different sorts of thing going on in this passage: he introduces νοῦς as the faculty that grasps concepts and 
alludes to “non-demonstrative understanding” that he developed in APo I.3.  This apparent inconsistency is also part 
of what motivates Bronstein, “Origin and Aim,” 32 to read APo. II.19 as an account of only how knowledge begins 





first to determine what sort of knowledge Aristotle expects us to have attained at the end of the 
ascent that he has described.  I find that APo II.19 reads sensibly if we take it that Aristotle is 
referring to the same intellectual act as grasping both the concept and immediate premises at the 
same time.28  Indeed, I doubt that anyone would say that one has grasped a concept if one cannot 
articulate at least one basic proposition about it.  So, while the two intellectual achievements may 
be able to be considered separately, I do not think that they ever actually occur apart from one 
another. 
Now that we have these controversial points out of the way, we should consider what I take 
to be the main way that Hume would object to the legitimacy of this battle rout simile.  For it is 
probable29 that Hume would object to the presupposition that the way in which the soldiers stand 
their ground does in fact represent the way in which perceptions hold in the mind.  Since, on 
Hume’s account, “these faculties [of memory and imagination] may mimic or copy the perceptions 
of the senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment.”30  
It seems that Hume could object that any one present perception may be able to hold its ground 
against the rout so long as it is being perceived, but that, once it slips into memory, it is no longer 
vivid enough to fend off the onslaught of unknowing.  A response to this objection is that vividness 
is hardly a necessary criterion for applying an experience to one’s knowledge.  One may only 
 
28 D.W. Hamlyn, “Aristotelian Epagoge,” Phronesis 21, no.2 (1976), 178, is sympathetic to the same sort of reading, 
saying that “It is this passage over which there has been most argument as to whether Aristotle is concerned with 
concept formation or knowledge as reflected in more and more general propositions.  I do not myself think that it 
matters much which one says since I think the two are correlative, and I suspect that Aristotle thought so too.”  
Perelmuter “Nous and Two Kinds,” 234 takes issue with such a reading, since concepts cannot be true or false, whereas 
propositions can.  He sees this difference to indicate that concepts and propositions cannot be grasped by the same 
faculty.  I take him to be making the mistake of applying strictly logical categories to a matter of epistemology.  This 
disagreement can be pinpointed to a reading of APo.: “But νοῦς is not concerned with [what could be otherwise . . .], 
nor is non-demonstrative understanding.”  APo. I.33 88b36-37.  The interpretative question is whether the Greek οὐδέ 
. . . οὐδέ is best translated along the lines of “not . . . in other words, not,” which coordinates synonyms, or as “neither 
. . . nor” introducing a second, distinct term. Hamlyn and I are sympathetic to the synonymous reading, while 
Perelmuter would argue for the latter reading.  
29 But only probable, for Hume himself never offered a direct argument against the battle rout of APo. II.19. 





faintly remember all the details of an eclipse, but that hardly prevents one from remembering the 
relevant universal feature: in this case, a certain privation of light.  Thus, remembered particulars, 
though less vivid in clarity, are still able to join current perceptions in building up a position of 
strength. 
 To make this point more clearly, we should consider Aristotle’s full treatment of memory 
in Mem.31  Hume asserts that “[t]he most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation,”32 
and since Hume gives absolute epistemic priority to impressions, empiricist that he is, the 
comparative dullness of memory gives it a second-class standing in Hume’s account of knowing.  
And it is this second-class standing, as we shall see in a moment, that disarms notions of knowledge 
that abound in Aristotle’s account. 
Now, Aristotle places memory second to perception not in authority, as Hume does, but in 
time, as lived experience dictates.  He takes for granted the standing of memory as sufficient to 
form a bridge between perceptions and more intellectual activity, as shown by the progression in 
APo. and when he discusses the progression from memory to experience in Meta., saying that “the 
several memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience.”33  Thus, 
for Aristotle, memory is the sort of thing that can hold its ground to turn around a battle rout.   
There is another critical difference in Aristotle’s account of memory that must be noted.  
Whereas Hume treats memory as a single phenomenon, Aristotle recognizes a distinction that is 
to be drawn between memory (μνήμη) and recollection (ἀνάμνησις).  Aristotle gives a treatment 
of memory in line with Hume’s, calling memory “a state or affection of [perception or conception], 
 
31 We treated the first half of this work in Chapter I, where Aristotle talks about μνήμη, memory in the sense of stored 
past perceptions.  
32 Enquiry, 10. 





conditioned by lapse of time,”34 and says that perceptions act “just as persons do who make an 
impression with a seal.”35   Hume falls short of Aristotle, however, by failing to give an account 
of recollection, which Aristotle expounds in the second chapter of Mem.  Recollecting is done 
“when one recovers some knowledge which he had before, or some perception, or some other 
experience.”36  This process of recollection is unique to humans37 and corresponds to the rationality 
that differentiates man from the rest of animals.  Aristotle calls recollection a “mode of inference 
(οἷον συλλογισμός),”38 that is, a specifically rational activity.  The role that recollection plays in 
moving from memory to knowledge is to organize those perceptions gathered in memory into a 
unified whole that is much more useful for gaining universal knowledge than is a disparate 
collection of memories.  Hume’s failure to discuss this feature of human memory accounts in part 
for the more fundamental shortcomings of his account of human knowing.  
 Now that we have seen how the battle rout simile shows how knowledge comes to be after 
different perceptions and memories happen over time, a non-temporal analysis of how greater 
cognitive states can arise out of lesser will serve as a final clarification of the battle rout simile.  I 
will make this analysis by way of comparison to the development of the polis in Pol. I.2.  This 
comparison has two parts.  First, a similarity to an account given in Pol. will shed light on the rise 
from perceptions to general knowledge.  Early in the treatise, Aristotle describes the way in which 
the city arises from smaller, more basic groups, “of male and female . . . and of natural ruler and 
subject,”39 and that, “out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, 
 
34 Mem. 1, 449b24f. 
35 Mem. 1, 450a33-b1. 
36 Mem. 2 451b2f. 
37 “Many also of the other animals have memory, but, of all that we are acquainted with, none, we venture to say, 
except man, shares in the faculty of recollection.” Mem. 2 453a7-9. 
38 Mem. 2, 453a10. 
39 Aristotle, Politics, trans. B. Jowett, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume II, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: 





the first thing to arise is the family.”40  Then, “when several families are united, and the association 
aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the 
village,”41 and finally “several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough 
to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the [polis42] comes into existence.”43  Thus, something that is 
altogether different from previous groups and individuals, namely the polis, which is self-sufficing 
in a way that the smaller groups are not.  Similarly, in the battle rout of APo., the formation of 
soldiers that makes “position of strength,” while composed of individual soldiers who could not 
as individuals hold a position against an enemy, is able to hold the position as a unit.  Thus, the 
building blocks of the whole come together to be something more than they would be on their own.  
In the Pol., men and women and masters and slaves come together to form a polis that can provide 
“the bare needs of life, and . . . of a good life,”44 which would be beyond their grasp as unassociated 
individuals.  In the battle rout, the soldiers come together to hold off an enemy whom they could 
not stop alone.  And in knowledge, the various perceptions that do not individually constitute any 
universal knowledge come together to cause a knowledge that is true in all cases.   
Secondly, we should note the way in which this difference in kind comes about.  A mob of 
ten thousand men is hardly a polis, a line of untrained men does not form a position of strength in 
a battle, and a lengthy memory of past particulars does not on its own constitute knowledge of a 
universal.45  This point that induction is not wholly reducible to perception and memory will be 
discussed in more detail later.  Here it is sufficient to note that Aristotle appeals to the same sort 
 
40 Pol. I.2, 1252b10. 
41 Pol. I.2, 1252b16-18. 
42 I leave this word untranslated because words such as “state” and “city” carry modern connotations foreign to 
Aristotle, and “city-state” is at least as obscure and phonetically displeasing as the transliterated Greek. 
43 Pol. I.2, 1252b28-29. 
44 Pol. I.2, 1252b30. 
45 Hamlyn “Aristotelian Epagoge,” 182 notes that “objections such as those which I mentioned earlier are largely, if 
not entirely, directed against the thesis that what happens at one stage is, when repeated, a sufficient condition for the 





of thing in each case to account for the unity that arises above the multiplicity.  In the Pol., it is the 
constitution that gives shape to the polis, for “the sameness of the [polis] consists chiefly in the 
sameness of the constitution.”46  In the battle rout, it is the training of the soldiers that allows them 
to hold a position of strength.  And in the case of knowledge, it seems to be the form already 
present in the perceived particular that assures that the case about the particular will be the case 
about all those things that share the same form.  Thus, in all three cases, it is something intelligible 
that brings about unity in the many things.  A constitution¾the result of human 
deliberation¾makes a city out of otherwise unrelated villages.  Training makes individual soldiers 
able to hold a position.  Form grasped by the knower makes what is the case about one particular 
apply to other related particulars. 
To what does this entire example amount?  What do we now know about induction that we 
did not know before?  With induction, Aristotle offers us a process whereby particulars of a given 
sort are remembered and articulated together by experience, then given general descriptions before 
finally being understood on a causal level.  The battle rout shows not only that perceptions play a 
necessary role in human knowing but also that they are, on their own, insufficient to account for 
the universality of such knowing.  As the soldiers become a wall, what matters to the gaining of a 
position of strength is not the individual idiosyncrasies of each particular soldier, but only that he 
is a soldier, trained to be part of a formation that stops an onslaught.  Similarly, each perceived 
thing, insofar as it contributes to the perceiver coming to have universal knowledge, matters not in 
its individual idiosyncrasies that a retentive memory can catalog.  Rather, the particular contributes 
that part of itself that makes it to be what it is generally, that is, its form. 
 





Now that we have seen, through the battle rout simile and from his accounts of the ascent 
to knowledge, what Aristotle takes induction to be positively, let us now turn to consider what 
induction is not.  Having seen that it is not an inexplicable appeal to magical powers, we should 
avoid the other extreme of mistaking it for something lower than what it actually is.  Aristotle is 
clear that something beyond perception and memory is necessary to arrive at knowledge, saying 
that “it is impossible to perceive what is universal and holds in every case.”47  The role, then, that 
perception plays in Aristotle’s account of human knowing is to get the knower to the threshold of 
universal knowledge, to show what has been the case with various particulars, and leave it to the 
intellect to arrive at what holds in all cases.  How exactly this step or process works is not described 
in detail at APo. I.31, but, in the same passage, Aristotle also says that “one necessarily perceives 
particulars, whereas understanding comes by becoming familiar with the universal.”48  In this way, 
Aristotle takes induction to be a sort of “becoming familiar with” what is universally the case. 
It will be helpful here to consider a case of what Aristotle does not have in mind when 
talking of this “becoming familiar with.”  Bertrand Russell offers the example of “[t]he man who 
has fed the chicken every day throughout its life [and] at last wrings its neck instead.”49  Here, 
Russell supposes that the act of induction is nothing more than the claim that what has been 
perceived will continue to be perceived without change or interruption, that the man who has fed 
the chicken will continue to feed the chicken without change or interruption.  Rather, the proper 
act of induction would not be the sort of assumption that things will continue but would rather be 
a certain insight into what is going on, namely that the man is fattening up the chicken to eat it one 
day.  If an observer or the chicken arrives at this insight, neither will be surprised by the man 
 
47 APo. I.31, 87b31-32. 
48 APo. I.31, 87b38-39. 





finally killing the chicken.  And if the chicken did not have this insight, it would seem unreasonable 
to say that the chicken had really become familiar with what was going on.  
We can now look at an example that Aristotle gives to consider what a more appropriate 
relationship between memories and induction is.  A few cursory mentions that he makes will serve 
to start.  In APo. I.31, the Philosopher describes induction as the process whereby “[after] we 
hunted the universal . . . , from several particulars the universal is [made] clear.”50  Aristotle is in 
this passage discussing how reasoning works to understand the cause of a phenomenon, such as 
an “eclipse.”51  Aristotle argues that perceiving even the mechanism whereby an eclipse 
occurs¾“the earth screening [the moon]”52¾is not enough to understand the cause of an eclipse.  
Rather, he says that such a realization is only likely to happen after several particulars have been 
observed, perhaps after hunting down, so to speak, the cause of an eclipse.  This process of going 
from many particulars to a single explanation is consistent with Aristotle’s account of induction, 
and thus the process that “makes clear” refers to induction.  Thus, it is not merely the accumulation 
of memories of eclipses that is necessary for coming to knowledge.  Rather, there is need for at 
least one step to go from the γνῶσις of memory53 to that of universal knowledge.54 
Aristotle continues to use the eclipse example later in another passage from APo. relevant 
to this matter, II.8, in which he discusses definition and demonstration.  Here, Aristotle handles an 
opposite concern about how knowledge comes about, not from memories, but from definitions and 
 
50 APo. I.31, 88a2-3. 
51 APo. I.31, 88a1. 
52 APo. I.31, 88a1-2. 
53 At APo. II.19, Aristotle is clear that perception is a sort of knowledge, or γνῶσις, since he says at 99b38-39 that, in 
some animals, “there is no knowledge (γνῶσις) outside perceiving.”  Shortly after he begins the ascent from perception 
through memory to universal knowledge, and it is safe to say that all steps along this ascent are γνώσεις.  
54 It should be clarified here that the knowledge that Aristotle has in mind is not the knowledge of first principles, 
which will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.  Induction as Aristotle is treating it in APo. I.31 is the sort 
of deduction that supplies the middle term of a syllogism (for instance, “a screening of the earth by the moon” to link 





deductions from prior principles.  At the conclusion of the section, he says that he has explained 
“how what a thing is is grasped and becomes familiar,55 hence no deduction and no demonstration 
of what a thing is comes about.”56  Here, Aristotle seems to be describing a move from one stage 
of incomplete knowledge that he outlined earlier in the same chapter,57 in which one knows that 
something exists and is a sort of way but does not know exactly what that something is.  For 
instance, one might observe an eclipse and know that it is “a sort of privation of light”58 without 
knowing the true nature of the eclipse, namely that it is a “privation of light from the moon by the 
earth’s screening.”59  Aristotle seems here to be suggesting that the sort of knowledge gained from 
experience, in this case exemplified by the general knowledge that an eclipse is some sort of 
privation of light, is not the complete form of knowledge.  This complete knowledge, which yields 
not only a description of the phenomenon but also an explanation of the phenomenon in question, 
is achieved in another way.  Having ruled out positing definitions and providing demonstrations 
as the way to get this complete knowledge,60 Aristotle leaves room to say that this knowledge 
 
55 The Greek word rendered as “becoming familiar” is γνωρίζειν, and Aristotle uses this word or related words when 
he is talking about induction and gaining experience through dealing with particulars as a way to gain universal 
knowledge.  At APo. I.31, 87b38-39, he says that “one necessarily perceives particulars, whereas understanding comes 
by becoming familiar (γνωρίζειν) with the universal.”  At APo. II.19, 100b3-4, he says that “it is necessary for us to 
become familiar with (γνωρίζειν) the primitives by induction”.  Finally, at EN VI.8, 1142a13-15, he says that “such 
[practical] wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar (γνώριμα 
γίνεται) from experience.”  Thus, it is fair to treat the discussion of “becoming familiar” in this passage as related to 
induction. 
56 APo. II.8, 93b15-16. 
57 APo. II.8, 93a19-24: “we cannot grasp what it is to be something without grasping the fact that it is; for it is 
impossible to know what a thing is if we are ignorant of whether it is.  But as to whether it is, sometimes we grasp this 
accidentally, and sometimes when grasping something of the object itself---e.g. of thunder, that it is a sort of noise in 
the clouds; and of eclipse, that it is a sort of privation of light; and of man, that he is a sort of animal; and of soul, that 
it is something moving itself.” 
58 APo. II.8, 93a23. 
59 APo. II.2, 90a15. 
60 APo. II.7, 92b35-38: “From this, then, it is evident . . . that definition neither demonstrates nor proves anything, and 
that you can become aware of what a thing is neither by definition nor by demonstration.”  What Aristotle rules out 
here is coming to understand the nature of something by positing definitions or arguing from prior principles.  Both 





comes from a leap past experience and into the realm of universal knowledge.  Such a rational 
leap, we have seen, is induction. 
 
3. Induction and First Principles 
We have seen now that induction is how Aristotle accounts for universal terms and 
propositions coming into the mind at the end of a process that begins with perception.  What 
remains to be seen is how the mind can reach beyond the conclusions of scientific knowledge to 
reach the first principles of science.61  There are two controversies in interpreting Aristotle on this 
matter, and responses to both should leave us with a clearer idea of what the Philosopher has to 
say about the ascent to first principles.  
The first controversy concerns whether or not Aristotle should be read as a rationalist or an 
empiricist.  Terence Irwin and Michael Frede take Aristotle to be a rationalist, and claim that, 
although perception plays a causal role in coming to knowledge, it does not play an epistemic 
role.62  Others, such as Robert Bolton and Marc Gasser-Wingate take perception to have an 
authoritative role in coming to know.63  To resolve this controversy, I will examine the rationalist 
case and then see how the empiricist side is able to get the same results while avoiding an essential 
pitfall.  
Frede’s account boils down to the claim that some sort of insight is responsible for our 
knowledge of universal principles, and the states of perception and experience that precede such 
 
61 I am leaving to the side the first principles of reasoning in general, such as the Principle of Non-Contradiction and 
that a whole is greater than one of its parts.  Principles such as these, which undergird all knowledge and not just a 
particular science, are a different matter that will not be addressed in this thesis.  
62 Terence Irwin, First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 136: “Experience and familiarity . . . form no part 
of the justification of first principles.”  Frede, “Rationalism,” 172: “Our knowledge of first principles is not 
epistemically, but only causally, based on perception.”  
63 Bolton, “Aristotle’s Method,” 29; Marc Gasser-Wingate, “Conviction, Priority, and Rationalism in Aristotle’s 
Epistemology,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 58, no. 1 (2020), 25: “The main claim of this paper is that we 





insights are only part of the temporal story, not any essential and epistemically necessary part of 
the account.  It seems that Frede’s account of epistemic causality is the same things that Aristotle 
considers as deductive certainty, which Aristotle describes in the APr when discussing the way in 
which a conclusion follows from the premises in a syllogism: “I mean by the last phrase64 that it 
follows because of them, and by this, that no further term is required from without in order to make 
the consequence necessary.”65  Since the advance from perceptions to universal knowledge does 
not follow this model, it does not count as a legitimate source of knowledge.  Something else, 
namely rational insight, has to supervene on the empirical ascent to give it the status of universal 
knowledge.  
The trouble with this reading of Aristotle, especially at APo. II.19, is that it is not the most 
convincing portrayal of an important part of the Aristotelian project, namely, the rejection of 
Platonic innatism.  While the following argument is not a decisive refutation of the rationalist 
reading, it does suggest that a reading that does not leave open the door to innatism would be 
preferred.  Early in APo. II.19, Aristotle rules out the possibility that such cognitive possessions 
of first principles “are present in us but escape notice.”66  He says that such a position is “absurd; 
for it results that we have pieces of knowledge more precise than demonstration, and yet this 
escapes notice.”67  To be clear, Frede does not claim that the first principles of particular sciences 
are innate; the problem with his reading is that it would still be possible to read Aristotle’s later 
account as consistent with innatism.  If it is not the perceptions and experience that at least in part 
confer epistemic standing upon universal knowledge, then it is entirely possible that it is not some 
 
64 “A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things being stated, something else other than what has been stated 
follows of necessity from their being so.” APr I.1, 24b18-19. 
65 APr I.1, 24b20-22. 
66 APo II.19, 99b25.  





power of intuition but rather innate but as-yet-unrecognized knowledge that causes such 
knowledge to come to be.68  Therefore, for Aristotle to reject innatism as clearly as he intends, the 
rationalist reading should be resisted.  
I will set this debate to the side however, for the argument that settles the upcoming 
controversy will also prove decisive in the next debate that I will consider.  Now, it remains to be 
seen what sort of process is necessary to go between knowing a proposition to be true and knowing 
that a proposition is in fact the first principle of a science.  Again, two camps can be discerned: on 
the one hand those who take induction to be capable of grasping principles as principles,69 and on 
the other those who take that something beyond induction (usually νοῦς understood as a faculty of 
the soul, or else “intuition”) is necessary to understand principles as principles.70  The appeal to 
intuition or to νοῦς will be shown to be unnecessary and not in accord with Aristotle’s larger 
project.  
First, I will show that there is a possible path to first principles that does not require 
anything in addition to induction.  Before doing so, however, it should be said that my claim here 
is not that, upon inducing a universal proposition that happens to be a first principle, one can 
immediately recognize first principles as what they are and know them as such.  Indeed, such a 
claim would seem to require some sort of mysterious ability to recognize first principles at a 
glance, and such a position is inconsistent with my intention here to be as parsimonious as possible 
 
68 Gasser-Wingate, “Conviction, Priority, and Rationalism,” 21 makes a similar observation: “innatism is compatible 
with perception’s being a causal starting-point for our learning.” 
69 Marc Gasser-Wingate, “Aristotle on Induction and First Principles,” Philosopher’s Imprint 16, no. 4 (2016), and 
Kosman, “Understanding, Explanation, and Insight,” 18-21 defend similar readings, both emphasizing that νοῦς in 
this context is the result of having learned principles, not the faculty whereby they are learned.  
70 Bayer, “Coming to Know,” 136-141 takes νοῦς to be a faculty as well as a product, and Irwin, First Principles, 134-





with Aristotle’s account of knowledge.71  Rather, what I am saying is that induction, rightly 
understood, can serve as a path not only to knowing the content of principles, but also to 
recognizing principles for what they are.   
To be able to recognize principles as such, however, it is insufficient to regard induction 
as nothing more than a process of reaching universal propositions from particular instances.  
Rather, we will need a slightly broader account, in which induction is “understood as a form of 
cognitive process from a range of particular truths to some universal explanation why all these 
truths hold.”72  Such a broadening of the definition of induction is justified, I think, because it still 
properly accounts for what induction does in moving from particular to universal propositions.  
Namely, the move is from the range of particular truths about observed particulars to an 
explanatory truth about the class as a whole.73  The same sort of move can be made over universal 
judgments to determine which ones are the first principles of a science.  Namely, once one has 
sufficiently surveyed the particulars and come up with a satisfactory list of universal propositions, 
one can see which propositions explain others, and which are not themselves explained by any 
others.74  Those propositions that cannot be explained by any other propositions are then taken to 
be the most explanatorily basic propositions of the science. 
 
71 Kosman, “Understanding, Explanation, and Insight,” 19 agrees: “We must avoid thinking that Aristotle takes there 
to be some immediate act of mental seeing that in itself is the source of or validates our knowledge of principles as 
principles.” 
72 Gasser-Wingate, “Induction and First Principles,” 15.  
73 The move from, for instance “all of these N that I have seen have quality X” to “All N are X,” when a proper 
induction and not merely a generalization, is a move to something explanatory because the universal claim that all N 
are X means that all N are X because they are N.  Aristotle makes this point at APo. I.5, 73b25-26: “I call universal 
whatever belongs to something both in every case and in itself as such,” emphasis added.  That is to say, the universal 
proposition is true for every particular and is true because the particulars fall into a certain universal class. 
74 Gasser-Wingate, “Induction and First Principles,” 15 puts it this way: “And if induction repeatedly fails to produce 
a universal explanation for some fact (that the celestial sphere moves in a circular way, say), it will “make evident” 
(46a27) its explanatorily primitive status.”  I should clarify here that this broader sense of induction does introduce a 
certain sort of discursive process, albeit one that is sufficiently distinct from the usual use of the term in Aristotle.  
Usually, “discursive” is used to describe arguments that end with conclusions that are new premises.  Here, no new 





Now that we have seen that the path of induction to full knowledge of first principles is a 
possible path, I now argue that the alternative¾the rationalist’s appeal to νοῦς or intuition¾is not 
a possible path in line with Aristotle’s larger project of natural science.  The larger mindset that I 
refer to is Aristotle’s conviction that any theoretical system must answer to the particulars that it 
is trying to explain.  We saw in Chapter I Aristotle’s criticism of certain astronomers in DC III.7, 
whose theoretical systems were “not consistent with the phenomena.”75  At the heart of this 
criticism is the conviction that principles should be changed in light of newfound evidence that 
they are false, since “[the final issue] in the knowledge of nature is the phenomena always and 
properly given by perception.”76  Therefore, first principles are rejected or confirmed explicitly by 
the particulars given in perception, and not by some mysterious power of intuition.  To ground 
knowledge of first principles in something other than, ultimately, perception, is to go against one 
of the foundational principles of Aristotelian natural science.   
This argument based on the fact that perceptions have the final say in confirming or 
rejecting the legitimacy of first principles is also decisive in settling the first debate in this section, 
concerning whether perception is epistemically related to knowledge, or only causally.  If there 
were no epistemic connection between perceptions and knowledge of principles, it seems 
impossible to say that the perception of something contrary to an accepted principle would require 
one to change one’s principle.  Yet, since Aristotle roundly condemns in DC those who fail to 
change their principles in light of new perceptual evidence, it must be that the rationalist reading 
must be abandoned.  
 
 
75 DC III.7, 306a6.  





4. Aristotelian Empiricism 
Having argued that Aristotle cannot meaningfully be called or read as a rationalist, it will 
be good to wrap up this discussion of Aristotle’s account of human knowing by considering in 
what way, if any, he could be called an empiricist.  Of course, the categories of rationalism and 
empiricism as we use them did not come about without many intervening centuries of linguistic 
and philosophical development, so to apply either of those terms to him is anachronistic.  
Nevertheless, to consider how Aristotle would respond to empiricist and rationalist77 claims will 
offer a good concluding look at how Aristotle describes the process of knowing relative to 
perception and experience. 
In broad terms, empiricism revolves around the axiom that “we have no source of 
knowledge in [some field of discourse] or for the concepts we use in [some field of discourse] 
other than sense experience,”78 or, as Aquinas puts it, “nothing is in the intellect that was not 
previously in sense.”79  Hume certainly falls into this camp, as he offers the following as an 
exhaustive account of the origin of ideas: “When we entertain, therefore, and suspicion that a 
philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but 
enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?  And if it be impossible to assign 
any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion.”80  By here assigning the proper source of ideas to a 
 
77 These terms are now being used in the more general sense pointed out at Peter Markie, “Rationalism vs. 
Empiricism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017), accessed December 8, 2020, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/rationalism-empiricism/.  The dichotomy between rationalism and 
empiricism as it pertains to interpreting Aristotle is confined to the previous section.  
78 Markie, “Rationalism vs Empiricism.” 
79 Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, in Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII, (Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1975), art. II, q. 
3, obj. 19. 





specific sensory or emotional81 impression, Hume places himself squarely in the tradition of 
British empiricism, in which he is preceded by Locke and Berkeley. 
Aristotle, though he agrees that perception is the first step in moving to knowledge, 
describes the process of knowing in this way: “from perception there comes memory, as we call 
it, and from memory . . . , experience . . . . And from experience . . . , there comes a principle of 
skill and of understanding.”82  Thus, without encountering particular things through perception, 
there would be no knowledge.  However, elsewhere, Aristotle is clear that “[n]or can one 
understand through perception [. . . for] it is impossible to perceive what is universal and what 
holds in every case.”83  Thus, it is clear that, for Aristotle, what comes to be in the intellect comes 
from sense, but is mediated by other substantive processes.  
What then, is the most basic distinction to be drawn between the thought of Aristotle and 
that of Hume?  Michael Ferejohn offers some clear insight into the matter by drawing up two 
principles of empiricism, one Aristotelian and the other decidedly not.  Ferejohn’s first principle 
of empiricism can be embraced both by Aristotle and by Hume, “The content of all knowledge (or 
all knowledge of a certain type) must be given by perceptual experience.”84  The second tenet of 
empiricism that he lists, however, removes Aristotle from the ranks of empiricists so considered: 
“Because the object of perception is always a particular, the content provided by perception is 
always particular.”85  Hume certainly seems to be on board with this premise.  We have seen Hume 
 
81 “By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, 
or desire, or will.” (Enquiry, 10, italics original, underlines added) It is clear that Hume does not leave open with this 
notion of emotional impression any possibility of a rational inductive process. 
82 APo. II.19, 100a4-8. 
83 APo. I.31, 87b29-32. 
84 Michael Ferejohn, “Empiricism and the First Principles of Aristotelian Science,” in A Companion to Aristotle, ed. 
Georgios Anagnastopoulos (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 71.  
85 Ferejohn “Empiricism and First Principles,” 71.  With this second tenet, we now arrive at the fuller discussion of 





say that all ideas in the mind are the direct product of perceptions86 and that we cannot have 
universal knowledge from our perceptual experience.87  Aristotle, on the other hand, is decidedly 
not; rather, Aristotle asserts that “perception is of universals.”88 
Scott points out that this seems to be a troubling claim,89 since it appears that Aristotle is 
saying that we do not perceive the particular at all, which would undercut the entire project of 
Chapter I.  To get around this trouble, it is important to remember two things.  First, right before 
Aristotle says that perception is of the universal, he says that “one perceives the particular,”90 
suggesting that there may be some distinction between the individual act of one perceiving, which 
picks out the particular, and perception in general, which is “of the universal.”  Scott suggests that 
this distinction is critical to making sense of this parenthetical remark that Aristotle makes, and 
cashes it out in the following way: “Perception denotes the potentiality . . . , while the use of the 
verb ‘perceive’ denotes an actualizing of that potentiality on a particular occasion with reference 
to a particular object.”91  In other words, perception in general can perceive any particular or a 
given sort; for instance, it can perceive any man at any time, but any particular act of perceiving 
will necessarily perceive only a particular individual at a given time.   
This distinction gets us very close to the ultimate Aristotelian principle that has been 
grounding his entire epistemological process from the start: hylomorphism.  Scott and others have 
 
86 Enquiry, 13: “When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion, that a philosophical term is employed without any 
meaning or idea . . . , we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?”  At Enquiry, 11, 
Hume specifies that by “impression” he means “all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, 
or hate, or desire.” 
87 Enquiry, 24: “In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience.” 
88 APo. II.19, 100b17.   
89 Dominic Scott, Recollection and Experience: Plato’s Theory of Learning and Its Successors (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 152.  It is also a tricky claim because at APo. I.31, 87b32, Aristotle says that “it 
is impossible to perceive what is universal and holds in every case.”  It is possible that the distinction between 
perception in general and particular acts of perception is also sufficient to untangle this aporia.  
90 APo. II.19, 99b17.  





noted that it is because Aristotle locates the universal form in the particular composite that he has 
no trouble admitting of an epistemic process that leads from perception of the particular to 
universal knowledge.92  Similarly, Jean De Groot notes that in certain mathematical instances, the 
universal principles themselves are directly observed.93  
It could be objected at this point that an empiricist such as Hume could allow that the 
universal is truly present in the particular but does not in fact appear to us.  This position seems to 
me to be trivially different from claiming that they do not exist in the particular at all.  For to say 
that something exists but is in no way perceivable, and in no way has any effect on the rest of the 
world is to say that the thing in question might as well not exist at all.94  Thus, I push back against 
this potential intermediate position, saying that, while it is an intelligible thing to say, it is not an 
intelligible thing around which to build a system of knowledge.  Either the universal exists and is 
discoverable, or for all intents and purposes it does not exist at all.  For Aristotle, the universal 
does exist in the particular.  Thus, Aristotle couches his scientific endeavor in the assertion that 
the universal is present in and discoverable from the particulars that instantiate it.  
 
92 Scott, Recollection and Experience, 155: “Aristotle answers that in a sense we do encounter the universal in 
perception, because the universal is not separate from the individual substances that we actually perceive.”  Also, 
Ferejohn “Empiricism and First Principles,” 71: “This is possible because these universals are for him (as they are not 
for Plato) actually present at the site of perception,” and Bayer, “Coming to Know,” 111: “Aristotle sees no Humean 
problem of induction from perception to knowledge. . . . This is because the universal is already somehow in the 
perceived particulars, so that no gap between them and universals need be bridged.” 
93 See Jean De Groot, Aristotle’s Empiricism: Experience and Mechanics in the Fourth Century BC, Parmenides 
Publishing (2014), 10-12.  She argues that, at least in the case of the moving radius principle, the mathematical 
principle at work was directly observed and not grasped by some later act of abstraction.  Her general claim is that “at 
least in the case of mechanical principles, mathematical objects originate in perception.” 
94 There is a great deal of analogous discussion in recent Hume literature about necessary causal connections, and 
whether he thought that they existed yet were unknowable or thought that they do not exist at all.  For a good summary 
of the various sides, see Roger, “Causal Connections,” 517-519.  This debate would suggest that it does in fact matter 
whether the universals exist unknowably or do not exist at all.  My contention is that, while it may be an interesting 
question for clarifying what exactly a given thinker thought, the answer to that question does not have any impact at 






 In this thesis, I have presented the comparable beginnings of Aristotle’s and Hume’s 
accounts of human knowing and their major point of difference concerning the possibility of a 
move beyond perception to universal knowledge.  I hope to have appealed to the Humean’s 
comfort in starting with perceptions and then gently shown how it is neither helpful nor necessary 
to follow down the path that Hume points out.  I hope also to have offered some clarity to the 
interpretation of Aristotle’s account, given the abundant ongoing debate concerning the best way 
to interpret the many things that he says about human knowing.  There is still, no doubt, much to 
be said about Aristotle’s account of knowledge, especially concerning the account in the DA which 
was not the focus of this thesis.  Nevertheless, I am confident that the reader has come to a fuller 
understanding of what Aristotle does and does not say about the way in which human beings come 
to know in the treatises here discussed, and to a fresh appreciation for the foundation that makes 






Adamson, Peter.  “Posterior Analytics 2.19: A Dialogue with Plato?”  Bulletin – Institute of  
Classical Studies 54, supplement 107 (2011): 1-19.  
 
Angioni, Lucas.  “Explanation and Definition in Physics I 1.”  Apeiron 34, no 4 (2011):  
307-320. 
 
Aquinas, Thomas.  Quaestiones disputatae de veritate.  In Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII.   
Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, Roma, 1975. 
 
Aristotle.  The Complete Works of Aristotle.  Edited by Jonathan Barnes.  2 Vols.  Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1984. 
 
Bayer, Greg.  “Coming to Know Principles in Posterior Analytics II.19.”  Apeiron 30, no. 2  
(1997): 109-142.   
 
Bealer, George, and Strawson, P.F.  “The Incoherence of Empiricism.”  Proceedings of the  
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 66 (1992): 99-143   
 
Bolton, Robert.  “Aristotle’s Method in Natural Science: Physics I.”  In Aristotle’s Physics: A  
Collection of Essays.  Edited by Lindsay Judson, 1-29.  Oxford: Clarendon Press (1991). 
 
Broackes, Justin.  “Did Hume Hold a Regularity Theory of Causation?”  British Journal for the  
History of Philosophy 1 (1993): 99-114.  
 
Bronstein, David.  “The Origin and Aim of Posterior Analytics II.19.”  Phronesis 57 (2012): 29- 
62.  
 
Butler, Travis.  “Empeiria in Aristotle.”  The Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (2003): 329- 
350.  
 
Coleman, Dorothy.  “Hume’s Alleged Pyrrhonism.”  The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26, no.  
4 (1988): 461-468.  
 
De Groot, Jean.  Aristotle’s Empiricism: Experience and Mechanics in the Fourth Century BC.   
Parmenides Publishing, 2014.  
 
Falcon, Andrea.  “Physics I.1.”  In Aristotle’s Physics Book I: A Systematic Exploration, edited  
by Diana Quarantotto, 41-59.  Cambridge University Press (2018).  
 
Falcon, Andrea and LeFebvre, David.  “Introduction: Aristotle’s Philosophy and the Generation  
of Animals.” In Aristotle’s Generation of Animals: A Critical Guide, ed. Falcon and  





Ferejohn, Michael.  “Empiricism and the First Principles of Aristotelian Science.”  In A  
Companion to Aristotle, edited by Georgios Anagnastopoulos, 66-80.  Chichester: Wiley- 
Blackwell, 2009.  
  
Frede, Michael.  “Aristotle’s Rationalism.” In Rationality in Greek Thought, edited by Frede and  
Gisela Striker, 157-173.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.  
 
Gasser-Wingate, Marc.  “Aristotle on Induction and First Principles.”  Philosopher’s Imprint 16,  
no. 4 (2016): 1-20.  
 
¾¾.  “Conviction, Priority, and Rationalism in Aristotle’s Epistemology.”  Journal of the  
History of Philosophy 58, no. 1 (2020): 1-27.  
 
Gregoric, Pavel and Grgic, Filip.  “Aristotle’s Notion of Experience.”  Archiv für die Geschichte  
der Philosophie 88 (2006): 1-30.  
 
Groarke, Louis.  An Aristotelian Account of Induction: Getting Something from Nothing.  Ithaca:  
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009.  
 
Hamlyn, D.W.  “Aristotelian Epagoge.”  Phronesis 21 no. 2 (1976): 167-184.  
 
Hart, H.L.A.  The Concept of Law.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.  
 
Hasper, Pieter Sjoerd and Joel Yurdin.  “Between Perception and Scientific Knowledge:  
Aristotle’s Account of Experience.”  Oxford Studies of Ancient Philosophy 47 (2014): 
119-150.  
 
Hume, David.  Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.  Edited by Eric Steinberg.   
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1977.  
 
¾¾.  Treatise on Human Nature.  Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton.  Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2000.  
 
Irwin, Terence.  Aristotle’s First Principles.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.  
 
Kosman, Aryeh.  “Understanding, Explanation, and Insight in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.”  
In Virtues of Thought: Essays on Plato and Aristotle by Kosman, 7-26.  Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press (2014). 
 
LaBarge, Scott.  “Aristotle on Empeiria.”  Ancient Philosophy 26 (2006): 23-44. 
 
Lennox, James G.  “Aristotle, Dissection, and Generation: Experience, Expertise, and the  
Practices of Knowing.”  In Aristotle’s Generation of Animals: A Critical Guide, edited by  





Lesher, J.H.  “’Just as in battle’: The Simile of the Rout in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics ii 19.”   
Ancient Philosophy 30 (2010): 95-105.  
 
Levine, Michael.  “Belief in Miracles: Tillotson’s Argument against Transubstantiation as a  
Model for Hume.”  International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 23, no. 3 (1988): 
125-160.  
 
Liddell, Henry James and Robert Scott.  An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon.  Mansfield  
Centre: Martino Publishing, 2013.  
 
Long, Douglas.  “Hume’s ‘Imagination’ Revisited.”  Theatre of the World 17 (1998): 127- 
149.  
 
Markie, Peter, "Rationalism vs. Empiricism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall  
2017 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta.  Accessed December 8, 2020.   
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/rationalism-empiricism/> 
 
McKirahan, Richard D., Jr.  “Aristotelian Epagoge in Prior Analytics 2.21 and Posterior  
Analytics 1.1.”  Journal of the History of Philosophy 21, no. 1 (1983): 1-13.  
 
Mounce, H.O.  “The Idea of a Necessary Connection.”  Philosophy 60, no. 233 (1985):  
381-388.  
 
Perelmuter, Zeev.  “Nous and Two Kinds of Episteme in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.”   
Phronesis 55, no. 3 (2010): 228-254.  
 
Popkin, Richard H.  “David Hume: His Pyrhronism and His Critique of Pyrrhonism.”  The  
Philosophical Quarterly 1, no. 5 (1951): 385-407.  
 
Rogers, Katherin A.  “Hume on Necessary Causal Connections.”  Philosophy 66, no. 258 (1991): 
517-521.  
 
Russell, Bertrand. “On Induction.”  In The Problems of Philosophy, 60-69. Mineola: Dover  
Publications, (1999).  
 
Scott, Dominic.  Recollection and Experience: Plato’s theory of learning and its successors.   
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.  
 
Smith, Robin. “Aristotle’s Logic.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020),  
accessed December 12, 2020.  
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/aristotle-logic/ 
 
Stanford, P. Kyle.  “The Manifest Connection: Causation, Meaning, and David Hume.”  Journal  
of the History of Philosophy 40, no. 3 (2002): 339-360.  
 
Winkler, Kenneth.  “The New Hume.”  The Philosophical Review 100, no. 4 (1991): 541-579.  
ProQuest Number: 
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality and completeness of this reproduction is dependent on the quality  
and completeness of the copy made available to ProQuest. 
Distributed by ProQuest LLC (        ). 
Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author unless otherwise noted. 
This work may be used in accordance with the terms of the Creative Commons license 
or other rights statement, as indicated in the copyright statement or in the metadata  
associated with this work. Unless otherwise specified in the copyright statement  
or the metadata, all rights are reserved by the copyright holder. 
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, 
United States Code and other applicable copyright laws. 
Microform Edition where available © ProQuest LLC. No reproduction or digitization  
of the Microform Edition is authorized without permission of ProQuest LLC. 
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346 USA 
28412234
2021
